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Art.    Article 
APEC    Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BIT     Bilateral Investment Treaty  
CETA    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
DOB    Denial of Benefits (Clause) 
DR-CAFTA   Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement 
EC    European Commission 
ECT    Energy Charter Treaty 
FCN    Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
FET    Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
GAI     Guaracachi América Inc 
ICC  International Chamber of Commerce (in reference to the 
Arbitration Institute)  
ICJ     International Court of Justice  
ICDR    International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes  
IIA     International Investment Agreement  
IIDS    International Institute for Sustainable Development 
ISDS    Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
ITA    Investment Treaty Arbitration 
MFN     Most Favoured Nation (Clause)  
MIT    Multilateral Investment Treaty 
NAFTA   North-American Free Trade Agreement 
PCA    Permanent Court of Arbitration 
SCC  The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce 
SCC Rules Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
TTIP    Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
TPP    Trans-Pacific Partnership 
UNCITRAL   United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNCTAD   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USA    United States of America 
US    United States 









The current international investment protection law and the investor-state dispute 
resolution mechanism in IIAs, investment treaty arbitration (ITA), recently referred to 
as ISDS, have both come under extensive criticism. The criticism has been widespread 
ranging from a scholarly perspective through policy-makers’ point of view to the 
opinions of the general public. For example, the investor-state dispute resolution 
mechanism has been criticised for its one-sidedness,
1
 for reducing sovereign’s ability to 
make legitimate public policy choices,
2
 for lack of transparency,
3




Whether the critics are correct or not, the so called “Denial of Benefits” clause (DOB) 
gives the respondent state an opportunity to be active. Although it is not a counterclaim 
against investors, states can use DOB clauses in IIAs to exclude third parties to the IIA 
from enjoying the benefits of the treaty without assuming reciprocal obligations. In 
other words, a state may refuse to protect investors or investments if it turns out that 
they are owned or controlled by a third party state. 
States has successfully invoked their right stemming from the DOB clause and denied 
benefits to investors. In a number of cases, the benefit that had been denied was the 
possibility of having a dispute resolved by international arbitration, the so called ISDS. 
DOB clauses are proving out to be effective means in fighting off the practice of treaty-
shopping. With one major exception. 
The DOB clause in the multilateral ECT
5
 has never been successfully invoked. States 
have tried to use the clause both on jurisdiction and merits in at least ten cases without 
                                               
1 States lack the ability to bring counterclaims and are thus tied into the passive role of a respondent, see 
eg Elizabeth Boomer, ‘Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Some 
Model International Investment Agreement Provisions’ (2014) 1 TDM 1, 31. 
2 eg Corporate Europe Observatory, ‘A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights: Investor Privileges in the 
EU-US Trade Deal Threaten Public Interest and Democracy’ (October 2013) 3 
<http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/transatlantic-corporate-bill-of-rights-
oct13.pdf> accessed 19 May. 
3 Boomer (n 1) 5. 
4 Eg Christian Tietje, Freya Baetens, ‘The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the 
Transatlantic and Investment Partnership’ (June 2014) MINBUZA 127. 




success. Tribunals have been consistent in the clause’s interpretation that it cannot be 
invoked retrospectively. Given this interpretation, respondent states would have to 
monitor foreign investors prior to the dispute or worse prior to the time the investment 
was made. This begs the question, if it is even possible for Art. 17 of the ECT to be 
operable? One cannot help but think that the clause is a “dead end”. 
This paper takes a complex look on the procedural issues of DOB clauses in IIAs with a 
particular focus on the DOB clause present in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in Art. 
17. The clause reads as follows: 
Article 17 
Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances 
Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of 
this Part to: 
(1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control 
such entity and if that entity has no substantial business activities in 
the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized; or 
(2) an Investment, if the denying Contracting Party establishes that 
such Investment is an Investment of an Investor of a third state with or 
as to which the denying Contracting Party: 
(a) does not maintain a diplomatic relationship; or 
(b) adopts or maintains measures that: 
(i) prohibit transactions with Investors of that state; or 
(ii) would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Part were 
accorded to Investors of that state or to their Investments. 
 
The topic of DOB clauses is relevant and will continue to be relevant for a number of 




Federation, in the set of Yukos cases.
6
 Secondly, it is now being partly relied upon also 
at the setting aside proceedings before the district court at The Hague.
7
 Thirdly, 
Slovakia is said to have used the right to deny benefits on several occasions in cases still 
pending.
8





1.1. Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a complex analysis of procedural aspects of 
DOB clauses in IIAs. The analysis focuses on the Art. 17 of the ECT as a unique 
example of a DOB clause. As part of the analysis the author intends to answer the 
following research questions:  
First, what are the distinguishing features of Art. 17 of the ECT that make it function 
differently from other DOB clauses? 
Second, given the arbitral decisions, can the Art. 17 of the ECT be effectively invoked 
by respondent states? 
                                               
6 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 226, 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 2009); Veteran Petroleum Limited 
(Cyprus) v The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (30 November 2009); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 
2009). 
7 Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, ‘Press Release of 6 February 2015’ 
<http://old.minfin.ru/en/news/index.php?id_4=24358> accessed 20 June 2015; for further analysis of the 
setting aside proceedings see Haley S. Anderson, ‘Will Russia Pay the Yukos Settlement?’ (IMR institute 
of modern Russia March 2015) <http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/law/2212-will-russia-pay-the-yukos-
settlement> accessed 20 June 2015. 
8 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Eastern Europe round-up: One Polish case ends at ICSID, while another proceeds 
at SC, Slovakia denies benefits of US BIT to would-be claimant’ (28 October 2014) 7 IAReporter; Luke 
Eric Peterson, ‘As investor in litigation-funded case (EuroGas) continues to rattle saber, Slovak Republic 
announces it will deny benefits under investment treaty’ (9 January 2013) IAReporter. 
9 eg (CETA) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (signed 1 August 2014, if approved, the 
agreement will come into effect in 2016); (Ukraine-Japan BIT) Agreement between Japan and Ukraine 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 5 February 2015); (Brazil-Mozambique BIT) 





The topic of DOB clause has already been extensively examined by numerous scholars, 
most recently by Gastrell and Le Cannu.
10
 However, apart from the study by Mistelis 
and Baltag,
11
 there has been no complex study on this topic.  
What new can this paper bring? The added value of this paper is threefold. Firstly, 
unlike the previous studies this paper offers two specific research questions. Secondly, 
chapter four attempts to use the analysis of the DOB case law to set out a defence 
strategy for the respondent states. Thirdly, the character of the paper’s analysis is 
strictly delimited by the author’s adhering to the following fundamental principles: 
Naturally, there is no standard DOB clause. Every DOB clause in an international treaty 
must be interpreted individually pursuant to the general rule of interpretation in the 
VCLT.
12
 Therefore, the scope of any DOB clause is determined by its bona fide 
interpretation according to its ordinary meaning in its context and in the light of the 
treaty’s object and purpose. 
Art. 31 and 32 of the VCLT read as follows: 
Article 31 – General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
                                               
10 Lindsay Gastrell, Paul-Jean Le Cannu, ‘Procedural Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in 
Investment Treaties: A Review of Arbitral Decisions’ (2014) 30 ICSID Rev 78, 80. 
11 Mistelis Loukas A and Baltag Crina Mihaela, ‘Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty’(2009) 113 Penn St L Rev 1301. 




interpretation of the treaty the application of its provisions; (b) any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that 
the parties so intended. 
 
Article 32 – Supplementary means of interpretation  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Accordingly, one can gauge inconsistency of arbitral decisions only when there are 




This paper focuses solely on the procedural issues on DOB clauses and Art. 17 of the 
ECT. It does not deal with other important aspects of DOB clauses in investment 
protection treaties such as burden of proof,
13
 definition of ownership and control and the 
interplay between DOB and MFN clauses.
14
 
                                               
13 Elvira R. Gadelshina, 'Burden of Proof Under the ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clause of the Energy Charter 
Treaty: Actori Incumbit Onus Probandi?' (2012) 29 Journal of International Arbitration 269. 
14 Jordan Behlman, ‘Out on a Rim: Pacific Rim’s Venture Into CAFTA’s Denial of Benefits Clause’ (May 




Another practical limitation of this paper is the fact that the author does not have direct 
access to the ECT library in Brussels. The ECT library contains the preparatory works 
of the ECT and could be of value when interpreting the treaty pursuant to the Art. 32 of 
the VCLT.  
However, it is submitted that this limitation is not detrimental to the research. Firstly, 
there are secondary sources available which reference the preparatory works and the 
negotiation history of the ECT. Secondly, some parties that did not in the end become 
signatories, in particular the USA, were heavily involved in the ECT negotiations. 
Thirdly and finally, in any case the preparatory works and negotiations history of the 






1.3. Sources and Methodology 
The area of ITA encompasses a variety of legal rules including international treaties, 
procedural rules of arbitral institutions and in some instances even rules of national law. 
As for the primary sources, this paper relies on the text of IIAs. The secondary sources 
consist of articles in law journals. As was already mentioned above, only Mistelis and 
Baltag
16
 have conducted a complex study on the topic of DOB clauses. Other articles on 
DOB clauses either map the recent case law, or deal with more general topics such as 
the definition of investor, treaty shopping or abuse of process. Some studies are due to 
their general focus relied upon infrequently, usually as fundamental authority for an 
introduction of a certain subtopic.  
A debate about the role of precedent in ITA has been ongoing for quite some time.
17
 
Although Art. 38.1.d. of the Statute of the ICJ expressly requires the Court to also take 
                                               
15 Alexander J. Bělohlávek, Ochrana přímých zahraničních investic v energetice (1st ed C.H. Beck 2011) 
para 305. 
16 Mistelis (n 11). 
17 See eg Zachary Douglas, ‘Can a Doctrine of Precedent Be Justified in Investment Treaty 




into account “judicial decisions”, there is no such express rule either in the ECT, IIAs or 
other applicable part of international law as to whether, and if so to what extent, arbitral 
awards are of any relevance for arbitral tribunals. Obviously, the decisions of other 
tribunals are not binding. In advocacy or adjudicatory decision-making, they are 
considered to the extent that they may shed any useful light on the issues being decided 
upon.  
In any case, for the purposes of academic research, arbitral awards and decisions offer a 
valuable source of information. Therefore, this paper tries to include all the publicly 
known cases and awards that have touched upon the subject of DOB clause. 
When providing background stories and political context of the relevant ITA, this paper 
relies predominantly on the service of Investment Arbitration Reporter. 
The majority of sources are in the English language. As for the sources in the Czech 
language not older than ten years only three publications seem to be of use. The area of 
ITA has been examined in general by Balaš and Šturma,
18
 but the procedural issues of 
Art. 17 of the ECT specifically have been discussed only by Bělohlávek.
19
 
As for methodology, this paper uses the legal hermeneutic method. Legal hermeneutics 
is a branch of philosophical hermeneutics and its purpose is „understanding“. The 
method is based, unlike in natural sciences, upon an involvement of the author, who is 
not a mere natural observer, but whose experience is linked with the act of 
understanding. Therefore, understanding requires a point of view of the author.
20
 The 
method is appropriate for a comprehensive analysis of DOB clauses and their respective 
procedural issues. It is used to map and explain different elements of the DOB clauses 
and their interpretation. The point of view of the author is represented by the 
fundamental principles this paper relies upon, which are set out in the subchapter 1.1. 
above.  
                                               
18 See Pavel Šturma, Mezinárodní dohody o ochraně investic a řešení sporů (2nd ed. Linde Praha 2008); 
Pavel Šturma, Vladimír Balaš, Mezinárodní ekonomické právo (2nd ed. C.H.Beck 2013). 
19 Alexander J. Bělohlávek, Ochrana přímých zahraničních investic v energetice (1st ed C.H. Beck 2011). 
20 Carel Smith, ‘The Vicissitudes of the Hermeneutic Paradigm in the Study of Law: Tradition, Forms of 




The hermeneutic method is supplemented by legal inductive method. Induction can be 
described as drawing inferences from specific observable events to general rules. 
Specifically, the evidence is collected about observable events and a premise is 
constructed based on the collected data.
21
 The inductive legal method is relied upon 
when answering the research questions set out above as well as in chapter 4 when 
attempting to produce a defence strategy guide for the respondent states contemplating 
the use of their DOB right. 
Essentially, this paper has two parts. The first part, ending with chapter 3 is 
predominantly descriptive. The second part, chapter 4 and 5 are prescriptive. The 
author’s ambition is to keep the two separate. However, one can often find that the last 
paragraphs of each descriptive section contain the author’s own submissions regarding 





When referring to the clause in general, the term DOB clause is used. On the other hand, 
when reference is made to a specific DOB clause, it is always indicated in which treaty 
the clause can be found. Although Art. 17 of the ECT contains the language “deny the 
advantages” rather than the conventional wording “benefits”, it is still referred to as a 
DOB clause. 
Some arbitral awards use the term “retroactive“, rather than “retrospective” in the same 
context. It is submitted that the former is more appropriate since the latter is in legal 
theory associated with statutes.  
                                               
21 eg William Thomas Worster, ‘The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law 





Art. 17 (2) deals with situations, which involve third states, with which the denying 
party does not maintain diplomatic relations or against which it applies Art. 17 (2) has 
not yet been invoked in practice and it seems unlikely that it will be frequently used in 
the future. Therefore, whenever a reference is made to Art. 17 without specifying the 
section, it should be assumed, if the need be in order to maintain the rational of the 
reference that the reference is made rather to Art. 17 (1), rather than (2). 
 
 
1.5. Outline of the Study 
The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of DOB 
clauses and the specific case of Art. 17 of the ECT. After first briefly introducing the 
main issues of the clause, it outlines the purpose and the scope of this paper as well as 
its limitations. Finally, the first chapter discusses the methodology, sources and the 
terminology used in this paper. 
The second chapter is theoretical and addresses the topic of DOB clauses in general. It 
starts with an overview of various definitions of the clause and gives examples of 
different theoretical approaches to the clause. The chapter further outlines the past, the 
present and the future of DOB clauses. Firstly, it describes the history of inclusion of 
DOB clauses in international treaties and the main procedural issues that tribunals 
frequently address. Secondly, it offers a closer examination of the notable arbitral 
awards, decisions and cases that have so far dealt with DOB clauses present in IIAs 
excluding the ECT. The cases are examined in the light of the main procedural 
questions in connection to DOB clauses. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the future of 
DOB clauses in three major multilateral IIAs that are currently under negotiations. 
The third chapter focuses specifically on the DOB clause in the ECT, the Art. 17. In 
order to answer the research questions set out above, one must start with explaining why 
Art. 17 is a unique DOB clause. Firstly, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the 




the relevant procedural issues. It examines the decisions in the light of the same 
questions as the overview of non-ECT cases in the previous chapter. 
Chapter four has a title “Government’s Guide to DOB”. It aims to show the procedural 
issues of DOB clauses from the perspective of respondent states that decide to deny 
benefits. The chapter assumes a form of a manual that would hypothetically guide the 
dispute stricken respondent state defence. 
The fifth chapter summarises the findings of the previous chapters and comments on 
some of the decisions of arbitral tribunal interpreting Art. 17 of the ECT. The chapter 
then answers the two research questions and proposes a possible explanation for the 
current state of affairs surrounding Art. 17 of the ECT. The author proposes a possible 
















2. “Denial of Benefits” Clause 
This chapter provides a general overview of DOB clauses in IIAs. It begins with a basic 
definition of the clause and its general purpose. The various specific purposes of 
specific DOB clauses are further described in the following subchapters. Furthermore, 
this chapter also contains a brief historical excursion in order to show that the concept 
of DOB clauses is a common feature in the field of public international law. Lastly, this 




2.1. Definition and Purpose of DOB Clauses 
Generally speaking, the purpose of DOB clauses in IIAs is to exclude third parties from 
enjoying the benefits of the IIA without assuming reciprocal obligations. In their effect 
DOB clauses give the host state a possibility to refuse to fulfil its obligations towards an 
investor or investment of a third party if certain conditions are met. These conditions 
may differ, but are generally directed to exclude nationals of third states that do not 
have any reciprocal obligations. Scholars and legal commentators usually define DOB 
clauses using their purpose. Dolzer and Schreuer saw DOB clauses primarily as a way 
to counteract treaty shopping or nationality planning. They defined them as follows: 
Under such a clause the states reserve the right to deny the benefits of 
the treaty to a company that does not have an economic connection to 
the state on whose nationality it relies. The economic connection 
would consist in control by nationals of the state of nationality or in 
substantial business activities in that state.
22
 
Other scholars and commentators stress safeguarding the status quo of the rights and 
obligations stemming from a treaty. Mistelis and Baltag see at least two proposes of the 
clause: 
                                               




to maintain reciprocity or asymmetry [sic] with regard to the benefits 
arising out of the protection offered by investment treaties, and to 




The UNCTAD’s Negotiator’s Handbook, a practical tool for negotiators of IIAs, defines 
the clause similarly in the following terms: 
The Denial of Benefits provision allows the host State to deny the 
benefits of the treaty to certain companies owned or controlled by 
nationals of a third country (nonparty to the treaty) or by nationals of 
the host State itself. The objective of this provision is to give host 
States an opportunity to exclude from the scope of the treaty certain 
companies that are not eligible to enjoy the benefits of the treaty due 
to economic, political or regulatory considerations.
24
 
Another negotiator’s handbook focusing on sustainable development
25
 offers a very 
practical and accessible commentary:  
[the DOB clause] has the impact of allowing the Parties to deny the 
application of the Agreement to investors and their investments when 
they may be established as a company in a “home state,” but in 
reality those companies are shell corporations in turn owned either by 
residents or companies in the host state or in third states that do not 




When battling treaty shopping, some claim that the significance of a DOB clause is in 
the fact that the clause is an alternative to invoking the principle of abuse of right: 
                                               
23 Mistelis (n 11) 1302. 
24 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Negotiators Handbook: APEC/UNCTAD Modules 
(December 2012) 105. 
25 Howard Mann and others, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development, Negotiators’ Handbook (2nd ed 2006) 
<https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_handbook.pdf > accessed 25 
June 2015. 




When available, a denial of benefits provision, rather than the 
principle of abuse of right, should be a respondent’s first choice when 
facing a claim brought by a company that appears to lack any genuine 
connection to its purported home State. There are several reasons to 
prefer a defense based on a denial of benefits provision. First, the 
abuse of right principle is not grounded in treaty text and is thus 
susceptible to unpredictable application, as illustrated by several 
recent decisions applying the principle. Second, expansive application 
of the abuse of right principle by tribunals would encourage claimants 
to develop their own theories of abuse of right by States, which in turn 
would increase State exposure under bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and erode the stability of investor–State arbitration.
27
 
However, perhaps the best way to define the DOB clause’s purpose would be to look at 
its alternatives. What can parties drafting an IIA use instead of a DOB clause to achieve 
the same effect? DOB clauses usually coincide with a broad definition of “investor”. In 
this sense, in order to prevent nationality planning, parties to a treaty may choose 
between having the definition of “investor” require an economic bond with the state and 
inserting into a treaty and a DOB clause. 
To give a concrete example, parties to an IIA can choose to include the following 
language to achieve a similar effect to a DOB clause:  
[I]nvestor of a Contracting Party” means: … a legal person either 
constituted or otherwise organized under the national legislation of a 
Contracting Party, and is engaged in substantive business operations 
in the territory of that Contracting Party.
28
 
Indeed, including more stringent requirements in the definition of “investor” will have 
an effect similar to a DOB clause. In this respect, one must not forget the reason why 
                                               
27 Mark Feldman, ‘Setting Limits on Corporate Nationality Planning in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
(2012) 27(2) ICSID Rev—FILJ 281, 283. 
28 Wording from Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government 
of the Republic of Belarus on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 9 April 
2008, entered into force 27 August 2009; see UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements 




states enter into IIAs. Capital importing states may want to attract as many foreign 
investors to invest in their territories as possible. Capital exporting states may want to 
protect as many of their nationals as possible. Moreover, increasing number of states are 
both capital exporting and importing. Therefore, excluding a certain type investors flatly 
without exceptions may prove undesirable from the parties’ perspective.  
In fact, doing so would result in depriving the parties of their right to choose whether or 
not they deny benefits to the investor of the other party. Having choice is a 
characteristic feature of DOB clauses. Commentaries to the US Model BITs support this 
view. The commentaries state that the purpose of the DOB clause is to “allow either 
party to determine whether to extend treaty benefits when involvement by nationals of 
either party is relatively minor.”
29
 Furthermore, all known DOB clauses have been 
interpreted to mean that the state must act to exercise its right to deny benefits. This fact 
is discussed for the case of Art.17 of the ECT in chapter 3 below. 
Finally, it is important to stress that similarly to other types of clauses in IIAs there is no 
standard DOB clause. Naturally, there are multiple versions of the DOB clause. And 
exactly in the same way like any other clause in IIAs, every DOB clause must be 
interpreted using the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).
30
 
Various DOB clauses are present in a number of BITs, in investment chapters of MITs 




 and even in the recently negotiated 
CETA.
33
 However, as Gastrell and Le Cannu rightly point out, not all investment 
treaties contain a DOB clause and the ultimate decision whether to include it or not 
remain with the parties to the treaty.
34
 Some states may decide not to include such a 
                                               
29 P.B. Gann, ‘The US Bilateral Investment Treaty Program’ (1985) 21 STAN. J. INT’L L. 373, 379-80. 
30 VCLT (n 12) art 31; the importance of sound treaty interpretation is stressed, inter alia, in almost every 
work of Kaj Hobér: See Kaj Hobér, Selected Writings on Investment Treaty arbitration (Studentlitteratur, 
8 December 2013). 
31 North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico (signed 17 
December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994). 
32 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (signed 5 August 2004, 
entered into 
force 1 March 2006). 
33 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (negotiations concluded 1 August 2014, if approved, 
the agreement will come into effect in 2016). 








In this manner, the Tribunal in Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine stated that DOB clauses must 
not be read into IIAs thus if they are not included in those IIAs: 
We regard the absence of [a DOB] provision as a deliberate choice of 
the Contracting Parties. In our view, it is not for tribunals to impose 
limits on the scope of BITs not found in the text, much less limits 
nowhere evident from the negotiating history.
36
 
In conclusion, the general purpose of DOB clauses is to maintain reciprocity. In IIAs the 
clause complements the definition of investor and provides an additional safeguard. To 
put it bluntly, no benefits for your investor if you do not assume the same obligations to 
provide benefits to my investors.  
 
 
2.2. History of DOB Clauses in Public International Law 
In order to further shed light on the purpose behind including a DOB clause in treaties, 
one must look at its history. This was done by Mistelis and Baltag
37
 and this subchapter 
relies predominantly on their findings. 
First forms of DOB clauses can be found for example in the US- Siam FCN: 
[…] neither High Contracting Party shall be required by anything in 
this paragraph to grant any application for any such right or privilege 
[exploration and exploitation of mineral resources] if at any time such 
                                               
35 Italaw, ‘Model BITs’ <http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties> accessed 20 June 2015. 
36 Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (29 April 2004) para 
36. For more on the scope of investor see Anthony C. Sinclair, ‘The Substance of Nationality 
Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2005) 20 ICSID Review – FILJ 357, 378–387. 




application is presented the grating of all similar applications shall 
have been suspended or discontinued.
38
 
However, the modern concept of the DOB clause has its origins in the US FCNs after 
1945. The US-China FCN from 1946 contains the following language: 
[…] each High Contracting Party reserves the right to deny any of the 
rights and privileges accorded by this Treaty to any corporation or 
association created or organized under the laws and regulations of 
the other High Contracting Party which is directly or indirectly owned 
or controlled, through majority stock ownership or otherwise, by 




There are some visible differences in the language between historical DOB clauses and 
the ones present in the IIAs. The underlying concept, however, has not changed. The 
USA have always been including DOB clauses in their BITs.  
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the other Party 
the benefits of this Treaty if nationals of a third country own or 
control the company and 
a) the denying Party does not maintain normal economic relations 
with the third country; or 
b) the company has no substantial business activities in the territory 
of the Party under whose laws it is constituted or organized.
40
 
A commentary to BITs based on the 1994 US Model BIT sheds light on some specific 
reasons for including a DOB clause: “a non-Party country with which the denying Party 
                                               
38 The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with Final Protocol between the United States of 
America and Siam (signed on 13 November 1937) art 1(8). 
39 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Republic of China, signed on 4 November 1946 and entered into force on 30 November 1948) art 
XXVI(5). 




does not have normal economic relations” includes a country upon which the USA is 





2.3. Procedural Issues of DOB Clauses 
Generally speaking, what all DOB clauses have in common is their structure as far as 
that they all have a procedural part and a substantive part. Procedural parts of DOB 
clauses indicate the manner in which the DOB right is activated and substantive parts 
lists the grounds that must be satisfied for the benefits to be denied. As set out in chapter 
1 above, this paper limits its focus to the procedural issues of DOB clauses, i.e. the 
issues in stemming from the procedural part of DOB clauses. 
 
 
2.3.1. Jurisdiction or Merits? 
Tribunals often decide on the question whether the DOB clause in question creates a 
jurisdictional hurdle or whether the clause is an issue of merits. The former situation 
would mean that if the DOB clause were effectively invoked, the tribunal would not 
have power to finally decide the dispute. The latter situation would mean that the power 
of the tribunal to decide would not be affected. The clause would become a defence on 
the merits in the sense that if the DOB clause were effectively invoked, the merits of the 
claims would not have to be gone into. Indeed, some tribunals and authors see this as a 
matter of “admissibility.”
42
 It is submitted that this issue is a mere question of 
terminology and that, in fact, the term “admissibility” is used for the latter situation 
“merits” in case the tribunal decides to treat the invocation of the DOB clause as a 
preliminary issue. 
                                               
41 Mistelis (n 11) 1305. 
42 Generation Ukraine, Inc v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/00/9, Award (16 September 2003) para 15.7; 




Although not all jurisdictions recognise the concept of admissibility, the distinction 
between jurisdiction, admissibility and merits is not unimportant.
43
 It is a doctrinal 
question going beyond the scope of this paper. However, to briefly explain the terms: 
Jurisdiction, in this sense, means the tribunal’s power to finally decide the dispute. By 




Of course, it is needless to repeat that every DOB clause must be interpreted pursuant to 
the rule of interpretation. However, one can observe that tribunals, in answering the 
question “jurisdiction or merits”, looked at the range of the benefits that are denied 
under the clause. If the benefits included the dispute resolution mechanism clause, 
tribunals tend to read the clause as a jurisdictional defence. 
An important topic that arises in connection with the question of jurisdiction or merits 
character of DOB clauses is burden and standard of proof. This topic is not the main 




2.3.2. Exercise of the Denial of Benefits Right and its Form 
The question whether a DOB clause works automatically or whether the state must 
actively exercise its right to deny benefits is one of interpretation. For DOB clauses in 
IIAs, the wording “reserves the right to deny” or “may deny” is typical and frequent.  
Tribunals have been consistent in their interpretation of these terms as indicating that 
the right to deny benefits is not automatic and must be invoked. The possible example 
                                               
43 See eg Jan Paulsson, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in Gerald Aksen and others (eds), Global 
Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum in honour of 
Robert Briner (ICC Publishings 2005) 601; Andrea M. Steingruber, ‘Some remarks on Veijo Heiskanen’s 
Note: Ménage à trios? Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
(2014) 29 ICSID Rev—FILJ 675. 
44 John G. Merrills, Gerald Fitzmaurice (eds), Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of 
International Law: Opinions on the International Court of Justice, 1961-1973 (Martinus Nijhoff 




of “an automatic” DOB clause can be found in the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services,
45
 which includes the following wording: “The benefits of this Framework 
Agreement shall be denied”. 
The DOB clauses do not specify the form of their invocation. The question of the 
appropriate form for the act of denial has also been discussed by tribunals. Some IIAs 





2.3.3. Retrospective or Prospective Effect? 
Having concluded that a state must actively exercise the right, the question of the 
appropriate timing arises. Does the exercise of the DOB clause have only prospective 
effects or could it have also retrospective effects? In other words, does the state have to 
exercise its right to deny benefits to the investor before the investment is made? Or after 
the dispute is filed? Once again, it is a matter of interpretation of each individual clause. 
At this point, suffice it to say that there seems to be a divisive line between the ECT 
decisions and the rest. 
The question of timing as well as other procedural questions regarding DOB clauses is 
discussed in connection to concrete examples in subchapters 2.4. and 3.2. below. 
 
 
2.3.4. Standard and Burden of Proof on Jurisdiction 
In ITA it is universally accepted that for the standard of proof on jurisdiction, tribunals 
apply two standards. In the context of factual issues which are common to both 
jurisdictional issues and the merits, prima facie standard is usually applied. However, 
                                               
45 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (signed 28 January 1992, entered into force 15 December 
1995). 




where a factual issue is relevant only to jurisdiction and not to the merits, a higher 
standard requiring the party to make it more likely than not that the fact the party seeks 
to prove is true. 
This stems from the often referred to reasoning of the Phoenix award on jurisdiction. 
The Tribunal in that case stated:  
[i]t … must look into the role [the] facts play either at the 
jurisdictional level or at the merits level … If the alleged facts are 
facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of the relevant BIT, 
they have indeed to be accepted as such at the jurisdictional stage, 
until their existence is ascertained or not at the merits level. On the 
contrary, if jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts, they 
have to be proven at the jurisdictional stage.
47
 
As for the burden of proof, the general principle of law is that a party claiming an 
assertion must prove that assertion.  
 
 
2.4. Notable Non-ECT Cases 
This subchapter provides an overview of the investment treaty awards and decisions 
addressing the issue of a DOB clause. Tribunals’ treatment of DOB clauses is examined 
against the specific provisions in their treaty.  
The importance of this analysis is twofold. First, it highlights the variety of wording of 
DOB clauses in IIA’s other than the ECT. Second, some tribunals engage in direct 
comparison of the respective DOB clauses with Art.17 of the ECT. Whether this is a 
correct approach is discussed in chapter 5. 
                                               




The depth of analysis of each award or decision is equal to their significance for the 
research purposes of this paper. Cases are examined solely on the basis of their 
treatment of the DOB clause. In particular, the following three areas are investigated:  
First, can the clause constitute a jurisdictional defence?  
Second, does the right have to be exercised, and if yes, how?   
And third, are the effects of the denial prospective or retrospective?  
Not every question is addressed in each case, because not all tribunals faced all the 
questions. It depends on the specific factual background of each case. 
 
 
2.4.1. CCL v Kazakhstan 
In this case
48
 a US based investor sought a claim against Kazakhstan at the SCC 
pursuant the SCC Rules on the basis of, inter alia, US-Kazakhstan BIT. The dispute 
arose from a terminated concession agreement. The relevant provision in the BIT reads 
as follows:  
[…] 2. Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the 
advantages of this Treaty if nationals of any third country control 
such company and, in the case of a company of the other Party, that 
company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the 
other Party or is controlled by nationals of a third country with which 






given the interpretation of the DOB clause in the context of the BIT, 
decided that the DOB’s requirements are amongst the conditions for the tribunal’s 
                                               
48 CCL v. Republic of Kazakhstan, SCC Case 122/2001, Jurisdictional Award (1 January 2003). 
49 The Treaty Between the United States of America And The Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (signed on May 19 1992, entered into force 




jurisdiction. Kazakhstan argued that Claimant was an “empty shell” and that was not in 
fact owned or controlled by a US citizen. Therefore the Claimant must show evidence 
and information about structure and nationality of its shareholders. The Claimant 
refused to comply arguing that they wished the shareholders to remain anonymous.  
The tribunal first stated that in case when reasonable doubt had been raised as to the 
actual ownership and control over the company seeking protection, the burden of proof 
is on the company seeking protection. Secondly, it held that although it was satisfied 
that the Claimant had been created under the laws of the State of New York, the 
Claimant failed to provide any information let alone evidence about its control. Finally, 
the tribunal agreed with Kazakhstan’s argument and found that it lacked jurisdiction 





2.4.2. EMELEC v Ecuador 
In this case
51
 an ultimate shareholder of EMELEC, a company incorporated in the USA, 
claimed for an alleged expropriation and denial of justice in relation to an electricity 
concession it ran in Guayaquil, Ecuador. The DOB clause in US-Ecuador BIT
52
 is 
identical to the US-Kazakhstan one in the case above.  
The tribunal did not decide directly on the matter of Ecuador’s DOB defence, however, 
it stated in dicta that the exercise of the DOB clause was timely, upon raising objections 
to jurisdiction,
53
 affording it a retrospective effect. The tribunal also stated that the 
determination of the substantive requirements of the DOB cause can only be dealt with 
on merits. 
                                               
50 CCL (n 48) 152. 
51 Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (2 
June 2009). 
52 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed 27 August 1993, entered into force 11 
May 1997) art 1(2). 




It is worth noting that the tribunal interpreted, although only in dicta, the identically 
worded clause differently from the tribunal in CCL v. Republic of Kazakhstan. From the 
little the tribunal stated one can conclude that it regarded the DOB clause to be an issue 




2.4.3. Generation Ukraine, Inc. v Ukraine 
In this case
54
 a US based construction company established a local company in Ukraine 
in order to obtain a construction permits for an office-building project. The permits were 
subsequently revoked. The DOB clause in US-Ukraine BIT,
55
 is identical to the DOB 
clauses in the US BITs mentioned above. Again, the benefits to be denied encompass 
the whole treaty, i.e. the dispute resolution mechanism clause as well. 
Similarly to the case above, the tribunal did not rule specifically on the issue, however, 
it stated:  
“This is not, as the Respondent appears to have assumed, a 
jurisdictional hurdle for the Claimant to overcome in the presentation 
of its case; instead it is a potential filter on the admissibility of claims 
which can be invoked by the respondent State.”
56
 
The tribunal in this case saw the DOB clause clearly as an admissibility issue. This 
interpretation is in line with the EMELEC tribunal. There is a clear dismissal, although 
in dicta, of the opinion that the DOB clause is a jurisdictional requirement. 
 
                                               
54 Generation Ukraine (n 42). 
55 Treaty between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed 4 March 1994, entered into force 16 November 1996). 




2.4.4. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v El Salvador 
In this case,
 57
 Pacific Rim Mining Corporation, a Canadian company, sought to mine 
gold and silver in El Salvador. After failing to obtain necessary permits, it claimed, 
through its US subsidiary, that El Salvador’s actions breached the country’s obligations 
under DR-CAFTA.
58
 The relevant part of the DOB clause in DR-CAFTA was Art. 
10.12. section 2. The whole Art. 10.12 reads as follows: 
Article 10.12: Denial of Benefits 
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of 
another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control 
the enterprise and the denying Party: 
(a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or 
(b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a 
person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the enterprise 
or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this 
Chapter were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. 
2. Subject to Articles 18.3 (Notification and Provision of Information) 
and 20.4 
(Consultations), a Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an 
investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and 
to investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial 
business activities in the territory of any Party, other than the denying 
Party, and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or 
control the enterprise. 
                                               
57  Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No ARB/09/12, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections (2 August 2010). 




It is to be noted that chapter 10 of DR-CAFTA, i.e. the treaty the benefits of which are 
to be denied, includes the dispute mechanism provision (Art. 10.17, 10.18).
59
 
Furthermore, under CAFTA and the Respondent‘s right to deny benefits is subject to 
the notification and consultation.
60
 
The tribunal took the view that the invocation of the right to deny benefits is linked to 
the jurisdiction and, consequently, must be raised within the time limits prescribed to 
such exceptions.
61
 Specifically, the Tribunal held that the DOB clause must be invoked 
no later than the Counter-Memorial, in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rule 
41.
62
 Thus, allowing for its retrospective effect and denying jurisdiction to the US 
Claimant based on the DOB clause in DR-CAFTA.
63
 
The reasoning of the tribunal was detailed with references to the rules in VCLT and 
with distinguishing previous decisions concerning the DOB clause.  
 
 
2.4.5. Ulysseas v. Ecuador 
In this case
64
 a US company, Ulysseas, claimed breaches of the US-Ecuador BIT 
concerning its investments in the Ecuadorian power-generation sector. For the 
underlying DOB clause, see the citation above of the US- Kazakhstan BIT in charter 
2.4.1., which is identical to the US-Ecuador BIT. 
                                               
59 CAFTA (n 32) art 10.17, 10.18. 
60 ibid art 18.3(1) To the maximum extent possible, each Party shall notify any other Party with an interest 
in the matter of any proposed or actual measure that the Party considers might materially affect the 
operation of this Agreement or otherwise substantially affect that other Party’s interests under this 
Agreement, art 20.4(1) Any Party may request in writing consultations with any other Party regarding 
any actual or proposed measure or any other matter that it considers might affect the operation of this 
Agreement. 
61 Pac Rim (n 57) para 4.92. 
62 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966). 
63 Pac Rim (n 57) paras 4.83-4.91. 




Ecuador invoked Art. I(2) of the BIT as an objection to jurisdiction and aim to deny 
benefits of the BIT to Ulysseas since the company was allegedly owned by a Brazilian 
national and had no substantial business activities in the USA.
65
 
The tribunal firstly established that the DOB clause in the BIT is able to bar jurisdiction 
and secondly that it can be exercised retrospectively. Specifically, it stated that must be 
invoked no later than the Statement of Defense, in accordance with the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.
66
 However, it subsequently found that the substantive requirements 




EMELEC and Ulysseas are both disputes based on the US-Ecuador BIT. The tribunals 
reached the same conclusions that the DOB clause in the treaty can become a 
jurisdictional defence.  
 
 
2.4.6. Rurelec plc v Bolivia 
On 31 January 2014, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the UNCITRAL Rules, 
rendered an award
68  
declining jurisdiction over the claims brought by one of two 




BITs. The tribunal 
partially based its decision on Bolivia’s invocation of the DOB clause in the former BIT. 
The latter BIT does not contain a DOB clause. 
                                               
65 Ulysseas (n 64)  paras 75, 172, 114. 
66 ibid paras 172–4. 
67 ibid para 190. 
68 Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec plc v Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2011-17, Award (31 January 2014). 
69 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed 17 
April 1998, entered into force 6 June 2001, terminated 10 June 2012), Bolivia has terminated this BIT. 
The US Department of State indicates on its website that,  as of the date of  termination, the treaty ceased 
to have effect, except that it will continue to apply for another 10 years to covered investments existing at 
the time of termination.’ See <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm#7> accessed 20 June 2015. 
70 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Republic of Bolivia for the Promotion and Protections of Investments (signed 24 




The Claimants were Guaracachi América Inc. (GAI), a company incorporated in the 
United States and its parent company Rurelec Plc, constituted under the laws of England 
and Wales. Following Bolivia’s nationalising of a local electric company the Claimants, 
being the company’s shareholders, alleged violation of multiple provisions of the US-
Bolivia and UK-Bolivia BIT. Bolivia challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the 
claims by invoking the DOB clause in Art. XII of the US-Bolivia BIT. 
Art. XII reads as follows: 
ARTICLE XII 
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the other Party 
the benefits of this Treaty if nationals of a third country own or 
control the company and:  
(a) the denying Party does not maintain normal economic relations 
with the third country; or  
(b) the company has no substantial business activities in the territory 
of the Party under whose laws it is constituted or organized.  
Firstly, the tribunal found that the requirements for the invocation of 
Article XII(b) had been satisfied. Then it stated that it considers the 
DOB clause to be a jurisdictional defence. Thirdly, the tribunal went 
on to determine whether Bolivia had invoked its right to deny the 
benefits of the BIT (including the benefit of having a dispute decided 
by an arbitral tribunal) in a timely manner. Put differently, whether 
the DOB clause in Article XII of the BIT can be applied 
retrospectively. 
The tribunal stated that “the very purpose of the DOB clause is to give the Respondent 






and as such the denial is activated when the benefits are being claimed. 
Accordingly, the tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction over the GAI’s claims.
 71
 
The treatment of the DOB clause in the Rurelec case is in sharp contrast to the treatment 
of the DOB clause in Art. 17 of the ECT
 
interpreted in decisions based on the decision 
in Plama v Bulgaria.
72
 In those decisions, the DOB clause was applied as a matter of 
merits and only with a prospective effect. Further analysis of Plama can be found below 
in subchapter 3.2.2.  
Consequently, some commentators
73
 suggested that there is a diverging case law when 
it comes to the scope and effect of the clauses. These comments are another contribution 






2.4.7. Adams & Co. Inc. v Slovakia 
Adams & Co. Inc., a US incorporated company, issued a notice of dispute regarding a 
claim under the US-Slovakia BIT,
75
 alleging that the Slovak Republic breached the BIT 
in connection with a domestic legal proceedings lasting for more than 15 years, which is 
considered by Adams to constitute a denial of justice.  
2. Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the 
advantages of this Treaty if nationals of any third country control 
such company and, in the case of a company of the other Party, that 
company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the 
                                               
71 Rurelec (n 68) para 376. 
72 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (8 February 2005). 
73 Carmen Núñez-Lagos and Olmedo Javier García, ‘The invocation of “denial of benefits clauses: when 
and how?’ (17 February 2014) Kluwer Arbitration Blog. 
74 For the debate see Behlman  (n 14).   
75 Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 




other Party or is controlled by nationals of a third country with which 
the denying Party does not maintain normal economic relations.
76
 
On 22 October 2014, the Slovak Republic exercised its right under the US-Slovakia BIT 
and denied benefits of the BIT to Adams. Slovakia did so by issuing an announcement 
on the official webpage of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic.
77
 In the 
announcement Slovakia stressed that the purpose of the BIT is to promote greater 
economic cooperation between the United States and the Slovak Republic with respect 




Slovakia stated that to their knowledge Adams is not engaged in substantial business 
activities in the United States and is controlled by a national of a third country. 
Accordingly, Slovakia informed Adams by means of a formal letter thereby exercising 
the State’s right to deny the benefits of the Treaty to Adams.
79
 Based on the available 
sources, Adams has not filed any claim in this matter under the BIT.
80
 
This case offers an example of how can states exercise their right to deny benefits.  
 
 
2.5. Future DOB Clauses 
This subchapter addresses the possible future versions of DOB clauses. It demonstrates 
the future significance of DOB clauses on the three currently negotiated multilateral 
treaties that include investment protection chapters. It may not be clear from the 
                                               
76 US-Slovakia BIT (n 75) art 2. 
77 Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, ‘Announcement about denial of benefits to Adams & Co. 
Inc. by the Slovak Republic‘ (23 October 2014) 
<http://www.finance.gov.sk/En/Default.aspx?CatID=10&id=78> accessed 19 June 2015. 
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subchapters below, but the character of the three IIAs, in fact, resembles the ECT, rather 






 is a free trade agreement between Canada and the European Union. The 
agreement is currently still at a legal scrubbing level. It has to be approved by the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament in order to enter into force. 
Most probably, all EU member states will have to give their approval. If approved, the 
agreement will begin to come into effect in 2016.
82
 Recently, CETA has met with 
opposition from some EU countries and its future remains uncertain.
83
 
Interestingly, CETA has both a DOB clause and a narrow definition of “investor” 
requiring an economic bond.
84
 The dispute resolution mechanism clause can be found in 
the same chapter under Art. X.17.  
Article X.15: Denial of Benefits  
A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of the other 
Party that is an enterprise of that Party and to investments of that investor 
if:  
investors of a non-Party own or control the enterprise;  
and the denying Party adopts or maintains measures with respect to 
the non-Party that:  
are related to maintenance of international peace and security; and  
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82 See European Commission, EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/> accessed 21 June 2015. 
83 Euractiv, MEPs unimpressed with Commission’s ISDS proposal (7 May 2015) 
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84 It has been unofficially confirmed that the EC proposed going the way of a narrow definition of 




prohibit transactions with the enterprise or would be violated or 
circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the 
enterprise or to its investments. [emphasis added] 
Article X.3: Definitions  
[…]For the purposes of this definition an ‘enterprise of a Party’ is:  
an enterprise that is constituted or organised under the laws of that 
Party and has substantial business activities in the territory of that 
Party; or  
an enterprise that is constituted or organised under the laws of that 
Party and is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a natural 




From the two provisions above one can make a number of observations. Firstly, the 
DOB clause in CETA does not fight “treaty shopping”. Its substantive part does not 
provide for a close economic link. This seems to have been left solely on the narrow 
definition of “enterprise”. Secondly, the DOB clause refers to the scope of the benefits 
being denied as “benefits of this Chapter”, therefore, one can argue that the DOB clause 




The TTIP is a proposed free trade agreement between the EU and the USA. The 
American government considers the TTIP a companion agreement to the TPP. The EC 
                                               




launched a public consultation on a limited set of clauses and in January 2015 published 
parts of an overview.
86
  
The fate of the TTIP and the final shape of its investment protection chapter are 
currently uncertain. The negotiations are still pending and it would be premature to 
draw any judgements on when or if the treaty is concluded. 
However, supposing that the treaty is successfully negotiated, it would very likely 
include a kind of DOB clause. As the negotiations of CETA have shown, one party to 
the negotiations, the EC, seems to be open to inclusion of a DOB clause. The other 
party to the negotiations, the USA, has a long history of including DOB clauses. 
Therefore, it is submitted that it can be reasonably assumed that not only the TTIP will 
contain a DOB clause, but also that the DOB clause will resemble the latest version of 
the DOB in the 2012 US Model BIT: 
Article 17: Denial of Benefits 
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the 
other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control 
the enterprise and the denying Party:  
(a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or 
(b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a 
person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the enterprise 
or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Treaty 
were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. 
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the 
other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial 
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business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a 
non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.
87
 
Recalling the wording of the DOB clause in CETA, including section 2., i.e. the part 
that is aimed at “treaty shopping”, might become superfluous in case there would be a 




The TPP is a proposed regulatory and investment treaty. So far, twelve countries in the 
Asia Pacific region have participated in negotiations on the TPP: Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam. Similarly to CETA and TTIP, this multilateral agreement has a 
larger scope than investment protection. As the negotiations are still pending it would 
be premature to estimate when the treaty will be concluded. 
A proposed draft of the investment chapter leaked was leaked in March 2014.
88
 
Naturally, due to its preliminary form, this draft should be taken with a grain of salt, 
however, at minimum, it can serve as an evidence of will to include a DOB clause. The 
TPP draft DOB clause reads as follows: 
Article II.14: Denial of Benefits 
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of 
another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if the enterprise:  
(a) is owned or controlled either by persons of a non-Party or of the 
denying Party; and  
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(b) has no substantial business activities in the territory of any Party 
other than the denying Party. 
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of 
another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control 
the enterprise and the denying Party adopts or maintains measures 
with respect to the non-Party or a person of the non-Party that 
prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or 
circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the 
enterprise or to its investments. 
The DOB clause in the TTP draft is very similar to the one in the 2012 US Model BIT.
89
 
The substance of the provision is identical, since the differences are rather formalistic. 
The first difference from Art.17 of the US Model BIT, which is immediately visible, is 
the fact that section 1. and section 2. have switched places and formal layouts. It is 
submitted that this fact will not have any practical effect other than highlighting the 
more frequently used grounds of DOB clauses. 
The second difference is that in section 2. of the TPP draft, the substantive ground “not 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the non-party” has been dropped.  
In conclusion, unlike in CETA, the DOB in the TTP draft has a larger scope. Its 
substantive part includes the requirement of a close economic link and therefore serves 
the purpose of fighting treaty-shopping, but unlike CETA, it gives the denying state the 





                                               




3. Article 17 of the ECT 
This chapter focuses on the special case of a DOB clause in the ECT. ECT is a 
multilateral treaty dealing specifically with intergovernmental cooperation in the energy 
sector.
90
 Fifty-two European and Asian countries have signed or acceded to the treaty.
91
 
When interpreting the ECT, next to its provisions, one may find it useful to look at its 
objectives set out in its introductory remarks:  
The fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the 
rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules 
to be observed by all participating governments, thus minimising the 
risks associated with energy-related investments and trade. 
As well as the treaty’s purpose expressed in Art. 2: 
Article 2 
Purpose of the treaty 
This Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-
term cooperation in the energy field, based on complementarities and 





3.1. Analysis of Art. 17 of the ECT 
This subchapter does not aim to make its own interpretation of the provision, but rather, 
it identifies individual elements of the provision and highlights some of their 
contentious parts. For the text of Art. 17 of the ECT see page 10 of this paper.  
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Art. 17 of the ECT can be found in its Part III, entitled “Investment Promotion and 
Protection”. The Art. itself is entitled “Non-application of Part III in Certain 
Circumstances” which suggest that the Art. entails certain circumstances under which 




The expression “Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny” suggests that the 
provision does not apply automatically, but that that right must be exercised to be 
effective. Unless that right is exercised, the investor or investment will continue to 
enjoy the substantive protections in Part III of the ECT. Therefore, having reserved the 
right, the state may or may not exercise its right.
93
 
It is obvious from the structure of Art. 17 (1) of the provision that the option to deny the 
benefits to certain entities exists only if those entities meet the two cumulative 
requirements, as the conjunction “and” is used. On the other hand, section (2) and its 
individual options in letters (a) and (b) are constructed alternatively. 
Furthermore, the scope of Art. 17 covers only the Part III of the ECT and not to the 
dispute settlement mechanism provision in Art. 26, which can be found in Part V. 
Therefore a state cannot deny the benefit of having the dispute resolved in accordance 
with Art. 26. It seems that Art. 17 does not prevent a tribunal from exercising it 
jurisdiction. 
Apparently, there is nothing in the negotiating history of the ECT that would suggest 
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3.2. ECT Case Law Overview 
This subchapter analyses the known arbitral awards and decisions addressing the 
procedural issues of Art. 17 of the ECT. The cases and their main findings are 
introduced chronologically from the eldest to the latest.  
The depth of analysis of each award or decision is equal to their significance for the 
research purposes of this paper. As already stated above, a detailed analysis of the facts 
of each case would be necessary in order to fully understand tribunals’ reasoning as the 
distinct factual background of each case may be an important factor of the tribunals’ 
particular decision. However, it is submitted that if the tribunals rule on the issue of Art. 
17 their statement of principle remains a valuable authority. 
In the same manner as the non-ECT decisions the following cases are examined solely 
on the basis of their treatment of the DOB clause. Similarly, the following three areas 
are investigated:  
First, can the clause constitute a jurisdictional defence?  
Second, does the right have to be exercised, and if yes, how and when? 
And third, are the effects of the denial prospective or retrospective?  
 
 
3.2.1. Petrobart Limited v Kyrgyzstan 
In the Petrobart case the Claimant, Petrobart Ltd incorporated in Gibraltar, claimed an 
unpaid gas delivery from a Kyrgyz state owned enterprise. The tribunal did not rule on 
the issue whether the DOB clause could be a jurisdictional defence.
95
 It found that the 
conditions for application of Art. 17(1) of the Treaty were not present. Interestingly 
                                               




however, the tribunal’s references to the proper timing, when jurisdictional objections 
must be made, indicates that the tribunal viewed Art. 17 as a jurisdictional defence.
96
 
The Petrobart case is also notable for the expert opinion of the former Secretary of the 
ECT Adnan Amkhan, who addressed, inter alia, the issue of Art. 17. He opined that a 
denying state must attempt to take such a step in a timely fashion: that is, either at the 
time when the investment is made or at the time when a legal action is initiated. Art.17 
should be invoked as a defence in a timely fashion is necessitated both by the principles 
of legal certainty and legitimate expectation.
97
 
Nevertheless, Petrobart is seldom used as an authority. In Khan Resources
98
 the 
Claimants also assert that the decisions in Petrobart and Amto
99
 cannot be cited as 




3.2.2. Plama v Bulgaria 
Plama
100
 is the first decision under the ECT to address the issue of Art. 17 in detail.
 
The 
Tribunal expressly noted that the DOB clause in the ECT is different from the ones in 
modern investment treaties.
101
 It is safe to say that Plama is the leading case of the ECT 
line of case law on the DOB clause. 
The Tribunal rejected Bulgaria’s arguments that Art. 17 is a jurisdictional requirement. 
It pointed to the specific wording of the provision and its reference to benefits “of this 
part [Part III]”, a part which does not include the dispute settlement clause. 
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The Tribunal was of the view that to the DOB clause could be invoked as a 
jurisdictional objection, it would mean that the Respondent invoking it would be “the 
judge in its own cause”. That is a license for injustice and it treats a covered investor as 
if it were not covered under the ECT at all.
102
 
When addressing the question whether the denial could have a retrospective effect of 
the clause, it decided the question in the negative. The Tribunal reasoned that the 
exercise of the DOB clause by the Respondent should not have a retrospective effect, 
because it would not be in accordance with the purpose of the ECT – a long-term 
cooperation in the energy field. It concluded that retrospective application might deny 
the investor legitimate expectations.
103
 
Notable critics of the Plama award point out the following flaws in its reasoning:  
Douglas argues against the “judge in its own cause” reasoning. He ironically states: 
“Even if Art. 17 did constitute a potential jurisdictional impediment, which does not, it 
would not be transformed into a “self-judging” provision unless the principle of 




As for the exclusive retrospective effect line of reasoning, the Claimant in Khan 
Resources points out that the Tribunal in Plama in quoting the ECT’s purpose as 
expressed in its Art. 2, omits the words “complementarities and mutual benefits”, thus 
ignoring the “reciprocal elements of the ECT.
105
  
Finally, it has been pointed out that the Plama interpretation has very impractical 
consequences, as it imposes on the host state the obligation to review every corporate 
structure, down to its smallest of subsidiaries and empty mailbox companies that may be 
contained somewhere within the investors group, of every investment that is made 
within its territory” if it wishes to exercise its right under Art. 17(1) of the ECT.
106
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3.2.3. LLC AMTO v Ukraine 
This case
107
 concerned a dispute between a Latvian investor and Ukraine arising out of 
bankruptcy of a nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The Respondent raised the DOB clause 
as a jurisdictional objection, however, the tribunal, satisfied that the substantive 
requirements for the clauses’ invocation were not met, avoided ruling on the issue: “[…] 
the Tribunal does not need to determine whether […] Respondent can exercise its right 





3.2.4. The Yukos set of cases 
This well publicised case consists of three parallel arbitrations,
109
 the Claimants, three 
controlling shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company (hereinafter Yukos), Hulley 
Enterprises Limited, a Cypriotic company, Yukos Universal Limited, a company 
organized under the laws of the Isle of Man, and Veteran Petroleum Limited, another 
Cypriotic company (hereinafter collectively “the Claimants”) initiated arbitrations 
against the Russian Federation in February 2005. The three arbitrations were heard in 
parallel. 
The Claimants complained that Russia took a series of measures leading to Yukos, in its 
time one of the world’s top oil and gas companies by market capitalization, being 
declared bankrupt. In its award on jurisdiction and admissibility the tribunal was very 
clear in adopting the same position as the tribunal in Plama. 
The tribunal went on to quote again the decision in Plama on the issue of the 
prospective effect of the clause that it would be against the ECT’s purpose to accord the 
clause a retrospective effect.
110
 Unlike Plama, however, the Yukos decisions on 
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jurisdiction do not expressly state that respondents must invoke Art. 17(1) before the 
relevant investment is made. 
Interestingly, professor Crawford, in his expert opinion on the issue of Art. 17 (1), 
acknowledges the practical difficulty of notifying offshore companies of the exercise of 
the Art. 17 right but asserts that this is why Art. 17(1) allows states to issue, by clear 
statement, denials respecting the whole class of investors and potential investors.
111
 
Crawford thus proposes the idea of an exercise of the denial not to an individual 
investor, but a kind of erga omnes type denial of benefits towards all “mailbox” 
investors. This idea is further discussed in subchapter 4.2. and chapter 5. 
 
 
3.2.5. Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v Kazakhstan 
Claimants in this case
112
 brought a claim against Kazakhstan in connection with a 
license to explore and extract hydrocarbons in the Liman Block in Western Kazakhstan. 
The Respondent invoked the DOB clause. The Tribunal dealt with the two issues in 
question in the reverse order. First, it found that the fact that a state must exercise the 
right to deny benefits to have effect could only lead to the conclusion that the DOB 
right has a prospective effect. Allowing a retrospective effect would conflict with the 
object and purpose of the ECT which is “to promote long-term co-operation in the 
energy field” (Art. 2 of the ECT above). Satisfied with ruling out the possibility of the 
DOB clause having any effect in that case, the Tribunal stopped its analysis there.
113
 
However, the Tribunal then rather surprisingly added in the same paragraph:  
The tribunal also does not have to decide whether in case of a change 
in the relevant factual circumstances or appearance of new facts, the 
host state may exceptionally be permitted to retroactively invoke the 
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right under Article 17(1) of the ECT at the time when it becomes 
aware of the new situation.
114
 
According to some commentators, the Tribunal presents the possibility that a State 
might successfully invoke Art. 17(1) even after arbitration commences if it can prove its 





3.2.6. Khan Resources Inc. and others v Mongolia 
This case is the latest publicly available case involving Art. 17 of the ECT.
116
 The 
jurisdictional decision has been made publicly available very recently and it offers a 
valuable synthesis of the parties’ argumentation in connection to Art. 17 of the ECT. 
For that reason, this decision will be examined in detail. The summary of the arguments 
relies partially on the recent analysis by Trevino and Peterson.
117
 
 The Claimants in this case were a Canadian company and its two affiliates, Khan 
Resources B.V. (Dutch) and CAUC Holding Company Ltd. (British Virgin Islands), and 
the Respondents were the government of Mongolia and a state-owned nuclear company 
MonAtom LLC. The Claimants sought compensation for Mongolia’s invalidation of 
mining and exploration licenses for a local uranium deposit. Apart from a breach of the 
ECT they also alleged a breach of Mongolia’s foreign investment law. The issue of Art. 
17 of the ECT will be presented in detail below. 
The Respondents argued, as a jurisdictional objection, that the Dutch affiliate, Khan 
Resources B.V. was a mailbox company owned or controlled by Canadian nationals and 
having no substantial business activities in the Netherlands. Pointing to Art. 17(1) of the 
ECT, the Respondents stated that the aim of Art. 17(1) of the Treaty is that ECT 
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benefits be awarded to “genuine nationals of contracting party states,” but denied to 
investors which have no real connection with a Contracting Party to the ECT, even if de 
iure they are organized within one of those contracting states,
118
 the Respondents 
further argued that a denial of benefits would encompass not only the investment 
protections found in Part III of the ECT, but also Art. 26, the dispute settlement 
provision, because that provision is tightly connected with Part III as it “applies only to 
alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT.”
119
 
In short, the Claimants’ position on this issue was that Art. 26 of the ECT is not situated 
under Part III of the ECT and therefore falls outside the scope of application of Art. 
17(1). 
The tribunal agreed with the Claimants. It stated that the ordinary meaning of Art. 17 
shows that this provision can operate to deny the Dutch company Claimant the benefit 
of substantive protections in Part III, but not the benefit of having the dispute decided 
by arbitration pursuant to Art. 26, which is situated in Part V. The Tribunal concluded 
that its views on that point agree with those of the tribunals in Yukos and Plama.
120
 
Therefore, the question of denial of the substantive benefits in Part III of the ECT could 
have been reserved for the merits. The Tribunal, nevertheless, noted that the parties 
agreed to treat the question as a preliminary one and spent a lot of time arguing it. Thus 
for reasons of procedural economy the Tribunal decided to deal with the question of Art. 
17 of the ECT and its implications in their decision on jurisdiction.
121
 
Importantly, the Claimants did not dispute the Respondents’ claim that Khan Resources 
B.V. fulfilled the substantive requirements of Art. 17(1) since it was a legal entity 
owned or controlled by Canadian nationals and had no substantial business activities in 
the Netherlands.
122
 Therefore the main disputed issue was how and whether 
Respondents could exercise its right to deny benefits under Art. 17(1) of the ECT.  
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First, the question of an automatic denial of benefits was raised. The Respondents 
argued that the ordinary meaning of “reserves the right to” does not suggest that any 
further action is necessary to exercise the denial of benefits if the Dutch Claimant 
satisfies the substantive conditions of Art. 17(1).
123
 
Second, in the alternative, on the question of temporal limits the Respondents argued 
that there were no time limits on the Respondents’ right to deny benefits even after 
commencement of arbitration to any entity satisfying the Art.’s substantive 
requirements. According to the Respondents, a host state might exercise its right when it 




For the Respondents, the interpretation proposed by the Claimants would impose on the 
state the “impossible task” of examining every corporate structure and monitoring 
changes in such structure if it wishes to avail itself of its Art. 17(1) right to deny 
benefits. The Respondents had a difficult task persuading the tribunal that the Plama 
and Yukos cases were “wrong” on this issue. Especially since, Mr. Fortier, one of the 
arbitrators on this case chaired the earlier Yukos cases.
125
 
The Tribunal noted that the object and purpose of the ECT is to create a legal 
framework in order “to promote long-term cooperation, based on complementarities and 
mutual benefits.” The tribunal thought that this objective was served best by reading Art. 
17(1) as if it leaves a space for states to use or not use the denial of benefits mechanism 
on an investment-by-investment basis.
126
 
The Tribunal, next addressed the question whether this ECT right may be effectively 
exercised toward a particular retrospectively, that is after the investor commences 
international arbitration against the host state. 
Noting that the text of Art. 17(1) does not answer this question, the tribunal resorted to 
the “object and purpose” of the ECT “to create a predictable legal framework for 
investments in the energy field”. For the tribunal, the predictability envisioned by the 
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ECT is fulfilled “only if investors can know in advance whether they are entitled to the 
protections of the ECT.” If an investor could be denied the benefits of the ECT “at any 
moment after it has invested in the host country”, it would find itself in an unpredictable 
situation that would “impede the investor’s ability to evaluate whether or not to make an 
investment in any particular state.”
127
 
The tribunal added that a good faith interpretation of the treaty would not allow a 
construction of Art.17 that would permit a host state to “lure” investors by ostensibly 
extending the protections of the ECT to them, but then deny these protections when the 
investor attempts to invoke arbitration.
128
 
For these reasons, the Tribunal held that Art. 17(1) did not operate to bar the Dutch 
claimant from invoking the Art. 17 of the ECT against Mongolia in this case. 
 
 
3.2.7. Ascom Group S.A. v Kazakhstan 
In this case,
 129
 the tribunal fully supported the view of the previous ECT tribunals and 
held that the DOB right is not a jurisdictional matter and may only have a prospective 
effect: “Art. 17 ECT would only apply if a state invoked that provision to deny benefits 
to an investor before a dispute arose.” 
This finding is in conflict with the one in Plama. The Tribunal in Plama stated that the 
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4. Government’s Guide to Denial of Benefits 
This chapter is perhaps unusual for a standard academic research. It aims to show the 
procedural issues of DOB clauses from the perspective of the right’s bearer - the 
respondent state denying the benefits. 
In order to achieve that aim, this chapter assumes a form of a manual that would 
hypothetically guide the dispute stricken Respondent state in its defence strategy. 
Admittedly, it largely consists of general observations of the analysis in subchapters 2.4. 
and 3.2. This chapter is based on the following assumption: 
First, generally speaking, the goal of a respondent party to a dispute is to have the claim 
dismissed preferably in the jurisdictional phase and failing that to have the claim 
dismissed on the merits and failing that the goal is at least to mitigate damages. 
Second, in the hypothetical case, the Respondent must be able, with reasonable 
expectations of being successful, to argue that the substantive requirements of the DOB 
clause are met. That means that at least one of the claimants is an entity owned or 
controlled by a third state and such entity has no substantial business activities in the 
area of the contracting party, in which it is organized, or any other ground necessary to 
successfully invoke to clause. 
Third, every case is different and there is no general DOB clause. It is therefore 
extremely difficult to address the issue in abstract. The principles set out below would 
in reality hinge on the specific factual background of the hypothetical case. 
 
 
4.1. Know Your Treaty 
It is very important for your strategy to analyse the DOB provision in the treaty on the 




Is the dispute settlement mechanism provision included within the benefits being 
denied? If the answer is yes, you have a high chance to have the claim against you 
dismissed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. If the answer is no, your treaty is 
probably the ECT and it may prove difficult to argue that the dispute settlement 
mechanism is an inherent part of the benefits. However, subject to certain other 
circumstances, you still can deny benefits at the merits stage. 
In any way, some treaties require that you first notify or consult the other party to your 
treaty.
130
 Knowing your treaty means being aware of the procedural requirements for 
the DOB clause. 
 
 
4.2. Deny the Benefits As Soon As Possible 
The timing of exercise of the right to deny the investor the benefits may under some 
circumstances prove crucial. If your treaty is not the ECT, you have relatively plenty of 
time. For example, the Tribunals in Pac Rim and Rurelec held that the last chance to 
invoke the DOB clause is in your counter-memorial/statement of defence.
131
 
If your treaty is the ECT, on the face of it, there seems to be very little you can do. The 
exclusively prospective effect of the clause means that unless you invoke you right 
under Art. 17 or notify the investor before the investment is made, the denial would 
have no effect. Essentially, there are two possible approaches. 
First, a certain hope, in this sense, was brought by the Tribunal in Liman. It stated that 
the host state may exceptionally be permitted to retroactively deny benefits at the time 
when it becomes aware that the grounds for the denial are satisfied.
132
 In other words, 
you would have to prove the relevant facts, your lack of knowledge and that such 
knowledge would have caused you to exercise your right to deny benefits. 
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Second, you could try making a general DOB notice as some tribunals and 
commentators suggested.
133
 This would be a denial of benefits not to an individual 
investor, but to every investor that would make an investment in the future. Make an 
announcement on your state’s official website that you are invoking your right to deny 
benefits to all the “treaty-shoppers”, that is to every investor that fulfils the ground in 
Art 17(1) of the ECT, and possibly every other investor meeting the 17(2) part. In this 
way, in could be argued, the requirement of the prospective effect would be met and 
benefits of Part III of the ECT successfully denied. 
However, the second piece of advice comes with a risk of driving back some investors 
that would otherwise invest in your territory, since you would effectively limit the scope 
of protection of the treaty for the future. 
 
 
 4.3. Appoint the Right Arbitrator 
The Khan Resources
134
 case demonstrated that it may prove difficult to persuade 
arbitrators who previously ruled on the same issue that they were wrong. Without 
naming any names, a few arbitrators and scholars that are often appointed as arbitrators 
expressed their opinion on the issues discussed and analysed above. There is no doctrine 
of precedent in the sense of stare decisis in ITA and every arbitrator must decide the 
case only on the basis of the parties’ submissions. 
Two major pieces of advice would be in place: 
If you are facing a claim based on a non-ECT IIA, you would want to appoint an 
arbitrator that does not see the DOB clauses strictly as an admissibility issue. 
Second, if your treaty is the ECT, do appoint the arbitrator that is likely to argue against 
the accepted Plama interpretation of Art. 17.  
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Based on the decisions and cases examined above one can make a number of 
observations. First, as explained in subchapter 2.3. above, Art. 17 of the ECT has a 
procedural part and a substantive part. Both parts create requirements, which the 
denying state must meet in order to successfully invoke the clause. Some tribunals 
usually start with the substantive issues. They first determine whether the substantive 
grounds for denial of benefits is fulfilled and only if it is fulfilled, then and only then the 
tribunals address the procedural issues of the DOB clause. 
Alternatively, some tribunals first decide on the procedural issues only to subsequently 
find that the substantive grounds are not fulfilled. The ruling on this issue therefore 
becomes obiter dicta, the value of which is debatable. 
Second, when interpreting Art. 17 of the ECT, some tribunals followed the rule of 
interpretation as set out in Art. 31 and 32 of the VCLT, whereas other tribunals were 




 referenced the 
“shall” language of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services as an example of a 
denial-of-benefits clause that would operate automatically. 
It is submitted that when interpreting Art.17, references to other IIAs, instruments such 
as model BITs or the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
137
 are not sources of 
interpretive authority for Art. 17(1) of the ECT under the general rules of interpretation 
for treaties found at Art. 31 and 32 of the VCLT.  
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5.1. Art. 17’s Exclusively Prospective Effect 
When interpreting Art. 17 of the ECT, a reference to other DOB clauses in other treaties 
should be avoided. Naturally, this follows from the general rule of interpretation 
pursuant to the VCLT.
138
 However, it is submitted that a direct comparison between Art. 
17 of the ECT and other DOB clauses outside the area of arbitral interpretation may also 
prove very difficult since the Art. 17 is simply too distinct a provision. 
It can be seen from the examination of the arbitral decisions and cases above that there 
are two separate worlds of DOB clauses. The world of the ECT and the world of the rest 
of DOB clauses. Three main issues have been examined in detail: the question of 
jurisdiction or merits, the question of a possible retrospective effect and the question of 
the proper timing of the exercise of the right to deny benefits. 
As for the first issue, the line between the two worlds seems to be sharp. Whenever the 
benefits to be denied include the dispute settlement provision, the invocation of the 
DOB clause is interpreted as defence to jurisdiction. The only exceptions being the 
opinions in dicta of the tribunals in Petrobart and Generation Ukraine.  
As for the retrospective effect, the demarcation is even sharper. The strictly prospective 
effect of Art. 17 of the ECT is based upon the subject and purpose of the treaty that, 
unlike any other treaty, stresses the long term cooperation in the energy field. It seems 
to favour stability and predictability over potential dangers of the practice of “treaty 
shopping”.  
As for the issue of the proper timing, tribunals interpreting the ECT did not need to 
address this issue in order to decide on the concrete matter. The issue has been closely 
connected to the question of effect of DOB clauses. Given the solely prospective effect 
of denial of benefits the question of a proper timing depends heavily on the concrete 
factual background of each case. It is therefore submitted that this question is of a 
secondary nature. 
                                               




It has been established that Art. 17 of the ECT and the rest of DOB clauses work 
differently, but what is the root of this difference? In the words of the first research 
question of this paper, what are the distinguishing features of Art. 17 of the ECT that 
make it function differently from other DOB clauses? 
One special trait of Art. 17 is the inability of the clause to constitute a jurisdictional 
objection. On its own, it would not make it impossible to invoke the clause, rather, it 
would merely make it a matter of merits or admissibility. It is submitted that this trait 
does not make the Art. 17 function differently from other DOB clauses nearly as much 
as the prospective effect.  
The prospective effect of Art. 17 of the ECT stems from the Plama line of interpretation. 
It makes it impossible to exercise the right under Art. 17 of the ECT retrospectively. If 
one would follow the Plama line of interpretation of Art. 17 of the ECT, in order to 
successfully deny benefits of Part III of the ECT, host states would have to engage in 
monitoring and screening every investor and investment in the energy sector. If the state 
found that the investor fulfils the substantive part of Art. 17, for example, it is a mailbox 
company, the state would notify the investor that it is denied the benefits under the ECT. 
Only then would the DOB clause be exercised effectively. 
Looking at the analysis above, the answer to the first research question must necessarily 
be the prospective effect, which has been attributed to Art. 17. The long-term character 
of the ECT creates a strong argument for the correctness of such interpretation.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the seemingly diverging treatment of DOB clauses stems 
from the fundamental difference in the scope of each type of clause. There is no general 
DOB clause. The scope of the clause is determined by the contextual wording of the 
clauses and their interpretation in accordance with the object and purpose of their 
respective treaties. The main distinguishing feature that makes it is practically 






5.2. Article 17 of the ECT Is Not Well Drafted 
The title of this subchapter is perhaps hyperbole. However, the fact is that Art.17 of the 
ECT seems to be practically impossible to invoke. This begs the question why? Is it 




On the contrary, it is submitted that the arbitrators interpreting Art. 17 of the ECT have 
not interpreted the Art. wrongly. As was established in the subchapter 5.1. above, the 
main distinguishing feature of the DOB clause in the ECT is its prospective effect. 
Indeed, the purpose the ECT is a special treaty focused on the energy sector. That has 
some important implications. One of these implications is the long-term character of the 
protected investments and focus on predictability and stability. This is inserted in its Art. 
2, which stresses the promotion of “long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on 
complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles 
of the Charter.” 
It is difficult to argue that this interpretation is against the contextual reading of the 
provision in the light of the ECT’s object and purpose. 
Turning to the second research question of this paper: Can Art. 17 of the ECT be 
effectively invoked by respondent states? The short and correct answer would be: it 
depends. There are countries, such as China, that have very strict screening processes in 
place. For these states, invoking Art. 17 to the investor before the investment is made 
means no trouble.  
In any way, the answer to the second research question is that the successful invocation 
is for the vast majority of states very difficult, nearly impossible. 
Going back to the beginning of this subchapter, if one assumes that the current line of 
interpretation of Art. 17 of the ECT is not manifestly wrong, why is it nearly impossible 
to invoke the clause? Is this really what the parties to the ECT had in mind when they 
drafted the clause? Answering the latter question in the negative, the only explanation 
                                               




that remains is that the Art. 17 of the ECT is not a well drafted clause. Hence the title of 
this subchapter. 
Nevertheless, the author would like to propose a solution. As have already been 
mentioned above in subchapter 4.2., a possible solution to the problem of the strict 
prospective effect of Art. 17 of the ECT, is for the states to exercise the right erga 




The counterargument to this idea has been that such a general declaration would 
necessarily have amounted to a reservation which had been expressly prohibited by Art. 




It is submitted, however, that on the contrary, the general prospective declaration of the 
state would be merely an act of invocation of the state’s right which is expressly 
reserved by Art. 17. For example, a state may decide that it is no longer interested in 
attracting as many investors as possible including “mailbox” companies. Accordingly, 
the state would then choose to limit the scope of the ECT’s benefits by excluding the 
“mailbox” companies. Future investors would therefore be advised before making an 
investment. 
In this way, states would achieve the purpose of Art. 17 of the ECT and at the same time 
meeting the requirement of doing so prospectively. 
 
 
5.3. Concluding Remarks  
This paper has conducted an analysis of procedural aspects of DOB clauses in IIAs. The 
analysis was focused on the Art. 17 of the ECT.  
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The first chapter outlined the scope of the research that was confided to procedural 
requirements and issues of DOB clauses. It expressly stated which areas are excluded 
from the focus of this paper and furthermore addressed the practical difficulties of 
analysing the ECT without the primary access to the ECT’s preparatory works. The 
author stressed from the beginning the basic principles of treaty interpretation and its 
application to the DOB clauses. Throughout the paper, the author commented whether 
tribunals interpreting DOB clauses followed the general rules of interpretation or not. 
This helped the author to indentify which arguments for various interpretations were 
stronger and which weaker. 
In the second chapter the author tried to provide as broader definition of DOB clause as 
possible bearing in mind that there is no standard DOB clause. The beginning of the 
chapter compiled definitions and identification of purposes of DOB clause from various 
scholars and commentators. The subchapter about the clauses’ history helped to 
highlight the fact that the clauses have been a part of modern international commercial 
treaties as well as the fact that the DOB type of clause is constantly evolving. The future 
of DOB clauses was illustrated on the three major multilateral IIAs that are currently 
under negotiations. 
All three CETA, TTIP and TPP will probably include some form of a DOB clause. The 
negotiated version of CETA and the publicly available draft TPP contained a specific 
wording of the clause resembling the non-ECT DOB clauses. The author concluded that 
while the fate of the form of dispute resolution mechanism of these treaties was 
uncertain, the presence of a DOB clause therein could be safely presumed. 
Chapter three analysed the specific case of Art. 17 of the ECT. As had been set out in 
the introduction of this paper, the preparatory works of the ECT as a primary sources 
was not available, however, the author managed to found secondary sources either 
citing the preparatory works or confirming that there is nothing in the negotiating 
history of the ECT that would suggest that the parties to the ECT intended anything 




Furthermore, the third chapter went through all the known arbitral awards and decisions 
addressing the procedural issues of Art. 17 of the ECT. This helped the author to gather 
the necessary information for the discussion in chapter five. 
Unlike the previous studies on this topic, this paper in chapter four used the analysis of 
the DOB case law to set out a defence strategy for the respondent states.  
In answering the research questions, the author confirmed that it was the prospective 
effect of the Art. 17 that was the main distinguishing feature that had made it practically 
impossible to successfully exercise the right to deny benefits of the ECT. Due to this 
interpretation a successful invocation of the clause has been for the vast majority of 
states very difficult, nearly impossible. The author noted that unless the parties to the 
ECT specifically intended for the clause to have a prospective effect, the only 
conclusion must necessarily be that Art. 17 is not a well drafted clause. 
Moreover, as a result of a discussion in chapter five, the paper suggested that states 
deny benefits generally as a “blanket” or erga omnes denial to all future investors 
meeting the substantive requirements of Art. 17(1). In that way, it could be argued, the 
requirement of the prospective effect would be met. The author would like to express 
hope that in the future some states will try to exercise their right in Art. 17 of the ECT 
against all the future “mailbox” investors. Given the established interpretation, it seems 
to be the only way to make use of the provision. 
Naturally, by engaging in a theoretical discussion of yet undiscovered territory of a 
general, erga omnes denial of benefits, there is a risk that the tribunals ruling on the 
issues will dismiss the author’s line of reasoning altogether. However, the author hopes 
that the suggested solutions how to overcome the procedural issues of Art. 17 of the 









Takzvané doložky odepření výhod (denial of benefits, neboli DOB) umožňují, aby stát 
odepřel výhody mezinárodní investiční smlouvy investorům, pokud se naplní určité 
předpoklady. Tyto předpoklady nejčastěji zahrnují situace, kdy je investor takzvanou 
prázdnou schránkou neboli „mailbox“ korporací, jež je sice založena ve státě, který je 
stranou mezinárodní investiční dohody, ale je vlastněna nebo ovládána osobami třetího 
nesmluvního státu. 
Důvodem vkládání DOB doložek do mezinárodních smluv o ochraně investic je snaha 
zachovat vzájemnost práv a povinností plynoucích ze smlouvy. Může totiž dojít 
k nežádoucí situaci, kdy investor nesmluvní strany požívá stejné ochrany jako investor 
státu, který je stranou smlouvy. Nesmluvní stát tak získává výhodu v podobě ochrany 
vlastního investora, aniž by sám měl povinnost poskytnout ochranu investorům států 
smluvních stran na svém území.  
Tyto státy lze označit za takzvané „free riders“, tedy za ty, které získávají výhody, aniž 
by samy za to něco poskytovaly. Z pohledu investorů z třetích států se jedná o praktiku 
takzvaného „treaty shoppingu“, kdy se korporace snaží nastavit svou vlastnickou 
strukturu tak, aby získala co nejvýhodnější ochranu poskytovanou právě mezinárodními 
smlouvami o ochraně investic. 
Cílem této diplomové práce je rozbor procesních požadavků DOB doložek 
v mezinárodních smlouvách o ochraně investic. Analýza se zaměřuje na specifický 
případ článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě. Součástí této analýzy je rovněž 
zodpovězení dvou výzkumných otázek: 
1) Které rysy článku 17 ECT způsobují, že funguje jinak než ostatní DOB doložky? 
2) Pokud vezmeme v úvahu dosavadní rozhodčí nálezy vztahující se k článku 17 






DOB doložky v mezinárodních smlouvách o ochraně investic 
Definice DOB doložek  
Dolzer a Schreuer definují DOB doložky takto: „Pomocí této doložky si státy vyhrazují 
právo odepřít výhody smlouvy subjektu, který nemá obchodní vazbu na ten stát, podle 
jehož práva je založen. Obchodní vazbu lze spatřovat v kontrole státními příslušníky 
toho státu nebo v udržování podstatných obchodních aktivit v onom státě.“
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Obecně řečeno tyto doložky umožňují, aby stát odepřel výhody mezinárodní investiční 
smlouvy investorům, pokud se naplní určité předpoklady. Nejčastěji tyto předpoklady 
zahrnují situace, kdy je investor takzvanou prázdnou schránkou, která je sice založena 
podle práva státu, který je stranou mezinárodní investiční dohody, ale je vlastněna nebo 
ovládána osobami třetího státu. 
Jak již bylo zmíněno výše, hlavním důvodem vkládání DOB doložek do mezinárodních 
smluv o ochraně investic je snaha zachovat vzájemnost práv a povinností plynoucích z 
mezinárodní smlouvy. Může totiž dojít k situaci, kdy investor nesmluvní strany požívá 
stejné ochrany jako investor státu, který je stranou smlouvy. Nesmluvní stát tak získává 
výhodu v podobě ochrany vlastního investora, aniž by měl povinnost poskytnout 
ochranu investorům států smluvních stran na svém území.  
Příhodný způsob, jak popsat DOB doložky, je podívat se na jejich alternativy. Co lze 
použít místo těchto doložek a zároveň dosáhnout stejného výsledku? V případě snahy o 
zamezení treaty shoppingu lze podobného cíle dosáhnout zúžením definice investora ve 
smlouvě. Požadavek ekonomického pouta (economic link) ke státu, který je stranou 
smlouvy, může být vložen jak v DOB doložce, tak může zužovat definici investora, 
popřípadě investice. 
Jako příklad lze uvést následující formulaci definice investora: 
                                               




[I]investor smluvní strany” znamená: … právnickou osobu založenou 
nebo řízenou podle právního řádu smluvní strany a mající podstatné 
obchodní aktivity na území smluvní strany.
143
 
Tímto způsobem lze sice zamezit praktikám treaty shoppingu, nicméně s takto 
formulovanou definicí investora mizí možnost volby, kterou umožňují právě DOB 
doložky. Možnost volby je důležitá, protože státy nemusí mít zájem odepřít výhody 
každému investorovi, který je prázdnou schránkou.  
DOB doložky jsou obsaženy ve velkém počtu mezinárodních smluv o ochraně investic. 




 také o nedávnou přijatou 
CETA.
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 Je nutné ale zdůraznit, že neexistuje žádná standardní DOB doložka, a jako 
každé ustanovení v mezinárodních smlouvách je třeba doložky vykládat pomocí 
obecného pravidla výkladu obsaženého v článcích 31 a 32 Vídeňské úmluvy o 
smluvním právu z roku 1969.
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Jako příklad často používané verze DOB doložek lze uvést doložku v dvoustranné 




Závěrečná ustanovení a vstup v platnost 
1. Smluvní strana může odepřít výhody plynoucí z této dohody investorovi druhé 
smluvní strany, který je podnikem této smluvní strany, a investicím takového 
investora, pokud investoři třetího státu vlastní nebo ovládají tento podnik a 
odpírající smluvní strana přijme nebo bude vůči třetímu státu zachovávat 
opatření, která zakazují transakce s tímto podnikem nebo která by byla porušena 
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144 Severoamerická dohoda o volném obchodu (n 31). 
145 Dominikánsko–středoamerická smlouva o volném obchodu (n 32). 
146 Komplexní hospodářská a obchodní dohoda  mezi Kanadou a EU (n 33). 
147 VCLT (n 12) čl 31, 32. Mimo jiné, z tohoto principu vyplývá, že pokud by se mělo mluvit o 
diskrepanci v rozhodování rozhodčích tribunálů, lze tak činit pouze v případě, že se objeví rozdílné 
interpretace jedné a téže DOB doložky v jedné a téže mezinárodní smlouvě. 
148 Dohoda mezi Českou republikou a Kanadou o podpoře a ochraně investic (podepsaná dne 6. května 




nebo obcházena, pokud by byly výhody plynoucí z této dohody poskytnuty tomuto 
podnik nebo jeho investicím. 
2. Na základě předchozího oznámení a konzultací podle této dohody může smluvní 
strana odepřít výhody plynoucí z této dohody investorovi druhé smluvní strany, 
který je podnikem této smluvní strany a investicím takových investorů, pokud 
investoři třetího státu vlastní nebo ovládají tento podnik a tento podnik nemá 
žádné podstatné obchodní aktivity na území strany, podle jejíhož práva byl 
založen. 
 
Procesní požadavky DOB doložek 
DOB doložky se zpravidla skládají ze dvou částí - z procesní a hmotné části. Procesní 
část upravuje, jakým způsobem mohou státy své právo plynoucí z doložky uplatnit, 
čímž klade na stát procesní požadavky. Hmotná část obsahuje výčet skutkových podstat, 
které musí být naplněny, aby uplatnění práva mělo kýžené účinky odepření výhod. 
V souvislosti s procesními požadavky na uplatnění práva odepřít výhody musí rozhodčí 
tribunály řešit následující otázky: 
1) Jde o námitku proti pravomoci (jurisdiction), přípustnosti (admissibility), nebo 
meritorní obranu? 
Odpověď na tuto otázku záleží na výkladu textu jednotlivých DOB doložek. Zpravidla, 
pokud rozsah výhod, které mohou být odepřeny, obsahuje ustanovení o řešení sporů ze 
smlouvy o mezinárodní ochraně investic, je použití doložky bráno jako námitka proti 
pravomoci rozhodčího tribunálu. Možnost řešení sporu v rozhodčím řízení je chápána 
jako výhoda, která může být odepřena. Pokud je odepřena, rozhodčí tribunál ztrácí 
pravomoc spor rozhodnout. 
Oproti tomu, pokud se ve výčtu výhod ustanovení o řešení sporu rozhodčím tribunálem 
nevyskytuje, znamená to, že DOB doložkou nelze namítat nedostatek pravomoci. Toto 




Podle názoru některých autorů je použití DOB doložky námitkou nepřípustnosti sporu, 
neboť odpírá veškeré hmotně-právní výhody, a tudíž má za následek zamítnutí 
žaloby.
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 Rozhodčí tribunál proto sice bude mít pravomoc rozhodnout, ale zamítne 
žalobu meritorně pro nepřípustnost. 
Na totožném principu je postaveno i pojetí DOB doložek jako meritorní obrany. Jde 
pouze o terminologický problém. Stát využije své právo odmítnout výhody jako obranu 
ve fázi meritorního rozhodování. Autor této práce vidí rozdíl mezi námitkou 
nepřípustnosti a meritorní námitkou pouze ve fázi sporu, kdy mohou být vzneseny. 
Pokud je meritorní námitka vznesena v předběžné fázi řízení, jde o námitku 
nepřípustnosti. 
 
2) Musí být právo plynoucí z DOB doložky aktivně uplatněno? Pokud ano, jakým 
způsobem? 
Tato otázka rovněž závisí především na výkladu každého jednotlivého ustanovení, 
nicméně zde panuje shoda, že pokud z textu doložky vyplývá, že uplatnění práva je 
ponecháno na vůli státu, má se za to, že toto právo musí být aktivně uplatněno. 
V opačném případě by se jednalo o odepření výhod automaticky, podobně jako u užší 
definice investora (viz výše). 
Způsob, jakým se toto právo uplatňuje, není v textu DOB doložek upraven, a proto 
přišly rozhodčí tribunály s různými návrhy. Většinou byla navrhována forma veřejného 
oznámení či oznámení přímo konkrétnímu investorovi.  
 
3) Má výkon práva plynoucího z DOB doložky účinek pouze do budoucna, nebo 
může působit zpětně? 
Za předpokladu, že právo odepřít výhody plynoucí z DOB doložky musí být aktivně 
uplatněno, vyvstává otázka, jestli působí i vůči investorům, kteří učinili investici před 
                                               




tím, než stát toto právo uplatnil. Tato otázka je opět věcí výkladu jednotlivých 
ustanovení mezinárodních smluv, nicméně je možné pozorovat jasný rozdíl v řešení této 
otázky ve vztahu k ECT oproti ostatním smlouvám o ochraně investic obsahujících 
DOB doložku (viz níže). 
 
Článek 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě 
Článek 17 ECT dosud nebyl úspěšně uplatněn. Státy používaly toto ustanovení jak 
v případě námitek nedostatku pravomoci rozhodčích tribunálů, tak jako obranu ve 
fázi řízení o vlastním sporu. Rozhodčí tribunály interpretovaly článek 17 tak, že je 
možné jej využít pouze vzhledem k budoucím investicím a investorům, tj. že oprávnění 
odepřít výhody je účinné pouze do budoucna. 
Takovéto čtení článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě by znamenalo, že státy by 
musely monitorovat zahraniční investory před vznikem sporu, nebo dokonce před tím, 
než by investoři uskutečnily investici. Vyvstává proto otázka, je vůbec možné v praxi 
využít právo, které státům poskytuje článek 17, nebo se jedná o „mrtvé ustanovení“? 
Článek 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě zní: (překlad autora) 
Článek 17 
Neaplikování části III v určitých případech
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Každá Smluvní Strana si vyhrazuje právo odmítnout výhody této části vůči: 
(1) podniku, pokud občané či státní příslušníci třetího státu vlastní nebo 
ovládají tento podnik a pokud tento podnik nemá žádné podstatné obchodní 
aktivity na území Smluvní Strany, podle jejíhož práva byl založen. 
(2) investici, pokud odpírající Smluvní Strana prokáže, že tato investice je 
investicí investora třetího státu, se kterým nebo vůči kterému odpírající 
Smluvní Strana: 
                                               




(a) neudržuje diplomatické styky; nebo 
(b) přijme nebo bude vůči třetímu státu zachovávat: 
(i) opatření, která zakazují transakce s tímto podnikem; nebo 
(ii) opatření, která by byla porušena nebo obcházena pokud by byly 
výhody plynoucí z této části poskytnuty tomuto podniku nebo jeho 
investicím. 
 
Z textu článku vyplývá několik důležitých okolností. Zaprvé formulace „vyhrazuje 
právo“ naznačuje, že správná interpretace článku je ta, která vyžaduje, aby bylo právo 
uplatněno. Zadruhé odkaz na část III v názvu článku i poté v textu jasně vyjímá z výčtu 
výhod, které mohou být odepřeny, ostatní části, včetně části V, která obsahuje 
ustanovení o řešení sporů vyplývajících z ECT. Článek 17 ECT tedy nelze použít jako 
námitku proti pravomoci tribunálu. 
K výše zmíněnému výkladu došel i Tribunál v případu Plama.
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 Tento rozhodčí 
tribunál se dále zabýval otázkou, zda lze právu odepřít výhody přisoudit zpětný účinek, 
tedy účinek na investice již učiněné. Jelikož text článku 17 tuto otázku neřeší, přistoupil 
Tribunál k výkladu pomocí předmětu a účelu smlouvy. Tribunál došel k závěru, že 
vzhledem k tomu, že účelem smlouvy je dlouhodobá spolupráce v oblasti energetiky, 
nelze investory nejdříve „zlákat“ tím, že v nich stát vzbudí očekávání v podobě výhod, 
aby je pak odepřel.
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 Článek 17 lze tedy uplatňovat pouze proti budoucím investicím a 
investorům. 
Tento závěr rozhodčího tribunálu byl posléze kritizován především s poukazem na DOB 
doložky ve smlouvách o ochraně investic odlišných od ECT, kde byly tyto doložky 
jasně vykládány jako způsob obrany v již započatém sporu, a tudíž je bylo možné 
uplatnit zpětně na již učiněné investice.
153
 
                                               
151 Plama (n 72) 149. 
152 ibid. paras 159-165. 




Dále byla tomuto výkladu vytýkána jeho nepraktičnost. Způsobuje totiž faktickou 
nemožnost uplatnění práva odepřít výhody, leda by státy monitorovaly veškeré 
investory a zkoumaly, zda svou povahou náhodou nesplňují požadavky článku 17 ECT 
a v případě, že ano, své právo by ihned uplatnily.
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 Možné řešení tohoto problému je 
nastíněno níže. 
 
Průvodce odepřením výhod 
Na základě rozboru rozhodčích nálezů, zabývajících se DOB doložkami, lze formulovat 
obecné zásady, kterými je třeba se řídit v případě, kdy stát čelící sporu z investiční 
smlouvy zamýšlí uplatnit své právo z DOB doložky. Následující zásady předpokládají 
situace, kdy hmotná část dané DOB doložky je splněna a zbývá jen právo z doložky 
řádně uplatnit. Tyto zásady jsou velmi obecně formulované a slouží pouze jako ilustrace, 
jak omezené jsou možnosti státu při snaze využít DOB doložku. 
 
Rozhodující je znění DOB 
Ze všeho nejdříve státy musí pečlivě vyhodnotit povahu DOB doložky ve smlouvě, za 
jejíž nedodržení jsou žalovány, neboť jak již bylo řečeno výše, neexistuje žádná 
standardní DOB doložka. Pro zvolení vhodné strategie při snaze uplatnit právo z DOB 
doložky je tedy nutné si nejprve ujasnit, jaké jsou procesní požadavky pro jeho 
uplatnění. 
Zahrnuje rozsah výhod, který má být odepřen, i ustanovení o způsobu řešení sporů?  
Pokud ano, pak je velmi příhodné právo z DOB doložky použít jako námitku proti 
pravomoci rozhodčího tribunálu. Jinými slovy, je třeba využít možnosti odepřít výhodu 
nechat spor rozhodnout v mezinárodní arbitráži. Pokud je odpověď záporná, lze namítat 
nepřípustnost sporu jako předběžnou námitku nebo případně vznést stejnou námitku ve 
fázi meritorního projednávání sporu. 
                                               





Nutnost co nejdříve uplatnit právo z DOB doložky 
Správné načasování uplatnění práva odmítnout výhody může mít zásadní vliv na 
úspěšnost státu jak při uplatnění svého práva z DOB doložky, tak případně na úspěch 
v celém sporu. Platí zde zásada čím dříve, tím lépe. Jak bylo naznačeno výše, v případě 
ECT je nutné DOB doložku uplatnit ještě před tím, než investor na území daného státu 
investuje. 
Některé smlouvy o ochraně investic obsahují specifickou povinnost konzultovat 
uplatnění práva s druhou smluvní stranou nebo investorem druhé smluvní strany.
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 V 
tomto případě je nutné tak učinit rovněž co nejdříve. V případě námitky pravomoci 




Jmenování správného rozhodce 
Součástí obranné strategie žalované strany v rozhodčím sporu je výběr vhodného 
rozhodce. Strany sporu běžně navrhují rozhodce na základě mnoha různých kritérií. 
Jedním z těchto kritérií může být i názor rozhodce na problematiku DOB doložek. Tyto 
názory mohou být známé z předchozích rozhodčích nálezů nebo i z akademického 
působení některých prominentních rozhodců.  V případě sporu ohledně uplatnění práva 
z DOB doložky lze formulovat tyto dvě obecné zásady: Za prvé v případě, že je stát 
žalován na základě ECT, je lepší zvolit rozhodce, kteří se neztotožňují s výkladem 
článku 17 v případu Plama. Za druhé při sporech na základě jiných mezinárodních 
smluv by obecným principem bylo navrhnout rozhodce, kteří se nepřiklánějí k názoru, 
že DOB doložky lze využít výhradě jako námitku nepřípustnosti sporu. 
 
 
                                               
155 eg DR-CAFTA (n 32) art 18.3(1) . 
156 V případě rozhodčího řízení podle pravidel UCITRAL čl 21, viz Pac Rim (n 57) paras 4.83-4.9; 




Diskuze a odpověď na výzkumné otázky 
Odpověď na první výzkumnou otázku, tj. Které rysy článku 17 Dohody o Energetické 
chartě způsobují, že funguje jinak než ostatní DOB doložky?, plyne ze skutečnosti, že 
článek 17 působí výhradně na budoucí investory a investice. Jedná se o hlavní rys 
tohoto ustanovení, který následně určuje jeho zvláštní povahu a velmi odlišný způsob 
uplatňování práv v něm obsažených. Díky této vlastnosti je téměř nemožné, nebo 
přinejmenším velice obtížné pro státy toto ustanovení využít a odepřít daným 
investorům výhody plynoucí s Dohody o Energetické Chartě. 
Ostatní rysy odlišující článek 17 jsou nemožnost jeho využiti jakožto námitky proti 
pravomoci rozhodčího tribunálu a včasného upozornění investora před jeho uplatněním. 
Tyto rysy však nejsou primární příčinou zvláštnosti článku 17 ECT.  
Nemožnost uplatnit DOB doložku jako námitku proti pravomoci rozhodčího tribunálu 
má za následek pouze to, že stát bude nucen ji uplatnit později, tedy v meritorní fázi 
řízení. Tato vlastnost tedy nezbavuje článek 17 jeho využitelnosti v praxi. 
Požadavek včasného upozornění investora je až druhotným rysem článku. Nelze ho 
proto označit jako za rys bezprostředně způsobující nefunkčnost článku 17 ECT. 
Dodržení včasného upozornění investora přímo závisí na působnosti odepření výhod. 
Pokud lze výhody odepřít pouze budoucím investorům, je jasné, že včasné upozornění 
nemůže být učiněno jindy než součastně s uplatněním práva z článku 17. 
Druhá výzkumná otázka, kterou si tato práce pokládá, tj. Lze vůbec úspěšně právo 
v článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě uplatnit?, je zodpovězena částečně záporně. 
Výše zmíněná interpretace přisuzující článku pouze budoucí působnost má za následek, 
že v praxi nelze bez přísných kontrol a screeeningu všech investorů a investic 
s předstihem identifikovat potenciální investory, kteří by splňovali podmínky pro 
odepření výhod podle článku 17. 
Určitý způsob, jak překonat svazující požadavek působnosti článku do budoucna by 
mohl být plošný způsob odepření výhod. To by znamenalo, že by stát prohlásil 
prostřednictvím příslušných oficiálních komunikačních kanálů, že od určitého data 




„investorům“ podle čl 1(7) ECT na svém území, kteří zároveň splňují dané požadavky. 
Takovýto způsob odepření výhod by pravděpodobně vyřešil překážku oné interpretace 
doložky, že výhody mohou být odepřeny pouze budoucím investorům, nicméně ani 
tento způsob však není bez problému.  
Článek 46 ECT stručně a jasně zakazuje jakékoliv výhrady k této smlouvě.
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 Je tedy 
možné namítnout, že takto plošné odepření výhod celému spektru investorů by 




Autor práce je opačného názoru. Za prvé není jasné, z jakého důvodu nazývat plošné 
odepření výhradou podle článku 17 ECT, především ve světle ustálené definice v článku 
2(1)d VCLT. Výhradu je možné učinit pouze při podpisu, ratifikaci, přijetí, schválení 
smlouvy nebo přístupu k ní. Za druhé odepření výhod podle článku 17 ECT nelze 
považovat za výhradu podle článku 46 ECT, neboť oba články jsou součástí téže 
smlouvy a mají stejnou právní sílu. Jakákoliv výjimka by musela být výslovně 
vyjádřena. 
Konečně, rozhodnutí, zda odepřít výhody budoucímu investorovi na svém území, je 
právo, které je vyhrazeno každému smluvnímu státu podle článku 17. V tomto ohledu 
není rozdíl, vůči kolika investorům budou výhody odepřeny. Vhodným způsobem 
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Cílem této diplomové práce je rozbor procesních požadavků DOB doložek 
v mezinárodních smlouvách o ochraně investic. Analýza se zaměřuje na specifický 
případ článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě. Součástí této analýzy je rovněž 
zodpovězení dvou výzkumných otázek: 
1) Které rysy článku 17 Dohody o Energetické chartě způsobují, že funguje jinak 
než ostatní DOB doložky? 
2) Pokud vezmeme v úvahu dosavadní rozhodčí nálezy vztahující se k této otázce, 
lze vůbec článek 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě úspěšně uplatnit? 
Tato práce je rozdělena do pěti kapitol. První kapitola představuje téma DOB doložek 
jednak obecně a dále se věnuje i specifickému případu článku 17 Dohody o Energetické 
Chartě. Druhá kapitola je teoretická a věnuje se tématu DOB doložek komplexně. 
Začíná definicí a významem doložky a poté uvádí příklady různých doktrinálních 
přístupů. Dále tato kapitola mapuje historii, současnost a budoucnost DOB doložek. 
Třetí kapitola se zaměřuje již výhradně na specifický případ DOB doložky, článek 17 
Dohody o Energetické Chartě. Stejně jako v předchozí kapitole jsou rozebrány případy 
a rozhodnutí rozhodčích tribunálů, které se dotýkají právě dané problematiky. Čtvrtá 
kapitola nazvaná „Government’s Guide to DOB“, poskytuje pohled na problematiku 
z pohledu státu, který hodlá využít svého práva z DOB doložky. Závěrečná pátá 
kapitola shrnuje poznatky předchozích kapitol a nabízí odpovědi na výše položené 
výzkumné otázky. Následně autor navrhuje řešení, jak se vypořádat s problematikou 
relativní obtížnosti využití práva plynoucího z článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě. 
Odpověď na první výzkumnou otázku vymezuje fakt, že článek 17 působí výhradně na 
budoucí investory a investice. Jedná se o hlavní rys tohoto ustanovení, který následně 
určuje jeho zvláštní povahu a velmi odlišný způsob uplatňování práv v něm obsažených. 
Díky této vlastnosti je téměř nemožné, nebo přinejmenším velice obtížné pro státy 





Druhá výzkumná otázka, kterou si tato práce pokládá, tj. Lze vůbec úspěšně právo 
v článku 17 Dohody o Energetické Chartě uplatnit?, je zodpovězena částečně záporně. 
Výše zmíněná interpretace přisuzující článku pouze budoucí působnost má za následek, 
že v praxi nelze bez přísných kontrol a screeeningu všech investorů a investic 
s předstihem identifikovat potenciální investory, kteří by splňovali podmínky pro 
odepření výhod podle článku 17. 
Závěrem autor navrhuje způsob odepření výhod podle článku 17 Dohody o Energetické 
Chartě, který by mohl být v souladu s požadavkem působnosti článku do budoucna. 
Jedná se o odepření výhod plošně, to znamená vůči všem budoucím investorům a 
















The so called “Denial of Benefits” clause (DOB) gives the respondent state an 
opportunity to exclude third parties to the investment protection treaties from enjoying 
the benefits of the treaty without assuming reciprocal obligations.  
No less than seventy-three investor-state disputes have been brought to arbitration under 
the ECT since its entry into force back in 1998. The DOB clause in ECT, Art. 17 has 
never been successfully invoked. States have tried to exercise their right in at least ten 
cases without success.  
This paper poses two research questions. First, what are the distinguishing features of 
Art. 17 of the ECT that make it function differently from other DOB clauses? Second, 
given the arbitral decisions, can the Art. 17 of the ECT be effectively invoked by 
respondent states? 
The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of DOB 
clauses and the purpose of this paper. The second chapter is theoretical and addresses 
the topic of DOB clauses in general and further outlines their past, present and future. 
The third chapter focuses specifically on the Art. 17 of the ECT it examines the ECT 
arbitral awards and decisions that touched upon the clause. Chapter four aims to show 
the procedural issues of DOB clauses from the perspective of respondent states, it 
assumes a form of a manual suggesting basic principle states should follow. The paper 
is concluded by a discussion in chapter five, where the author proposes a possible 
solution to the problem with invoking of the clause. 
In answering the research questions, the author notes that the main distinguishing 
feature that makes it practically impossible to successfully exercise the right to deny 
benefits of the ECT is its prospective effect. Due to this interpretation a successful 
invocation of the clause is for the vast majority of states very difficult, nearly 
impossible. In conclusion, the author entertains a hypothesis that At. 17 of the ECT is 





Based on the analysed data, the paper suggests a possible solution to this problem. A 
state could deny the benefits of the ECT to a whole class of investors at once by a 
















doložka odepření výhod, Dohoda o Energetické Chartě, článek 17 Dohody o 
Energetické Chartě, mezinárodní investiční arbitráž, spory investor-stát 
 
